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By Kenneth Lasson*
The Constitution is not a suicide pact.
– Justice Robert Jackson1
He was not a suicide bomber, he was on a military operation and he was a martyr.
– Mariam Farhat2
INTRODUCTION
The simple vision sanctifying the Declaration of Independence – that life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights – is quintessential to the American psyche.   No less 
taken for granted are the deep-rooted notions of fairness and justice nurtured by the Constitution 
and guaranteed by the Bill of Rights: the First Amendment’s fundamental freedoms, limitations 
on unreasonable governmental intrusions, and procedural protections afforded those accused of 
having committed a crime.  
In times of terror and tension, however, civil liberties quickly become subjective. 
Survival, after all, is still and understandably a nation’s strongest instinct – even at the cost of 
individual rights.  As this is being written at the dawn of the Twenty-first Century, over two 
*
 Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. I am grateful to my research assistant on this project, Michelle Weiler, 
for her diligence and skill in bringing together disparate elements of a lengthy manuscript.  Thanks are also due to 
two former assistants, Tora Scott and Carl Zacarias, who worked on earlier drafts.
1 Dissenting in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 at 37 (1949).  This oft-quoted dictum is in fact a 
paraphrase of Justice Jackson’s statement (“There is a danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic 
with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”), and has been 
variously attributed to others, like Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes (see Editorial, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 860) and Arthur Goldberg (see ,e.g., Amy Hack, Forfeiting Liberty, 2 CARDOZO PUBLIC L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 469 at 514). Holmes never said it.  Goldberg did, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144 at 160 (1963).
2 Newly elected member of Hamas, on her pride at losing three sons in jihad (“I knew what he was going to do.  
And when he succeeded, I was happy and I thanked G-d. . . . They are all martyrs.”) Quoted in Fiona Bartongaza, 
Mother of All Martyrs, NEW YORK POST (Online Edition), February 27, 2006.
4centuries of traditional American ideals appear to be genuinely in jeopardy.
This article examines the perilous quest to preserve them.
*
Citizens have been deprived of various rights and freedoms from the earliest colonial 
days, especially in their religious beliefs and practices.  Such restrictions, particularly during 
times of war, were not eliminated by either the birth of the nation or the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights.  In most of these cases the limitations on liberty were deemed warranted as necessary to 
insure order or preserve national security.   
Only in hindsight have we come to realize that this end-justifies-the-means approach has 
seldom if ever been justified – that the government’s regulation of basic freedoms does not 
ultimately preserve national security.   As Justice Brennan observed, “After each perceived 
security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil 
liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error 
when the next crisis came along.”3
Put another way: Must we become like our enemies in order to defeat them?  We may 
debate the question of whether hindsight has always proven that limitations on liberties were 
always unjustified, but in an era suicide bombers and non-governmental terrorist groups bent on 
destruction of democracies, does historical experience retain any relevancy?  Have we reached 
the point where we must fairly face the question of whether there are limits to historical 
perceptions?
In any event, achieving a proper balance between individual rights and national security, 
however, is less a matter of simple adherence to abstract principle than it is a daunting task of 
3
 Justice William J.  Brennan,  Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security 
Crisis, Address to the Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem at 1 (Dec. 22, 1987), available at  
http://www.capaa.wa.gov/pdf/brennan/pdf.
5eternal vigilance.   The wartime challenge we face is to remember well the lessons learned in the 
past.  In this day and age,  when whole societies appear to be genuinely in jeopardy at the hands 
of international terrorists and rogue nations with weapons of mass destruction, to what extent can 
we afford to indulge in the civil liberties we have known and cherished?
Part I of this article is a brief history of civil liberties in America during past conflicts –
focusing particularly on the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.  It also  
questions the thesis promulgated by Chief Justice William Rehnquist in his 1998 book, All the 
Laws but One,  that in times of war Presidents and courts rightly restrict freedom and defer to the 
military on matters of national security.  Part II describes the various actions taken by the 
government to conduct the so-called war against terrorism – including invasions of privacy, 
immigration policies and controls, profiling, pre-trial detentions, and secret military tribunals
Part III analyzes the serious Constitutional questions raised by the government’s actions in its 
conduct of the current war against terrorism.
Our national purpose has become how best to preserve both the national security and the 
individual liberties we enjoy as Americans – noble and fundamental goals, the acquisition and 
maintenance of which themselves raise issues both profound and practical.
How best can we once again meet that historic challenge?
6I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES DURING WARTIME
The First Hundred Years
The Revolutionary War4
The status of American civil liberties during wartime is hardly a new issue. Suppression 
of fundamental freedoms during times of real or threatened hostilities began very shortly after 
the nation’s founding.
In 1798, only seven years after enactment of the Bill of Rights, the United States found 
itself on the brink of war with France – which itself was in the middle of a revolution raging 
throughout Europe.  In response, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, making it a crime 
for an individual or organization to publish criticism of federal officials or the government, and 
authorizing the president to detain or deport citizens who did.5  These measures were not 
popular.   A few states passed resolutions in protest, calling the laws “palpable violations” of the 
Constitution and charging that the states’ “silent acquiescence [in accepting the acts was] highly 
criminal.”6
When Thomas Jefferson was elected President in 1800, he pardoned those convicted 
under the Alien and Sedition Acts – but the laws were never repealed, despite strong public 
opposition.  The Sedition Act expired under its own terms, and the Alien Act remained on the 
4
 Although the deprivation of religious liberties during the colonial period is a relevant precursor to the subject 
matter of this Article, a thorough treatment of that subject must, for space reasons, be presented elsewhere.  For a 
summary of religious freedom in early America, see Kenneth Lasson, Free Exercise in the Free State:  Maryland's 
Role in Religious Liberty and the First Amendment, 31 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 201 (1989) and Free Exercise in the 
Free State: Maryland's Role in the Development of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 81 (1988).
5
 Chs. 58, 66, 74, 1 Stat. 570, 577, 596 (1798).
6
 About two-dozen people were jailed under the Sedition Act for criticizing President John Adams See generally 
Debora K. Kristensen, Finding the Right Balance:  American Civil Liberties in Time of War, 44-Dec Advocate 
(Idaho) 20 (2001). See also Michael Kent Curtis, Symposium: Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other 
and the Next Century: Teaching Free Speech from an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV. 231 (2000).
7books until the time of World War II.7
Tensions between the Press and the Military
Although the press and military play critical roles in the maintenance of democracy, the 
inherent objectives of each are often at odds with one another.  It is because of their differing 
(and sometimes opposing) purposes that governmental restrictions on the media during times of 
tension and war have often increased.  Despite the public’s dependency on the press for news 
and opinion, the military has virtually unfettered power to limit access to the battlefield.  
Outright suppression of dissenting points of view has been has been less commonplace in 
America’s wartime history than in that of other nations, but the military has always exercised its 
right to impose restrictions on reporters and its inclination to manipulate the information they 
receive.
Military officers generally view secrecy and surprise as essential to successful war 
strategy.  The press, on the other hand, exists to gather and report as much news as it can and to 
hold the government accountable – an objective that is fundamental to traditional American 
values.
The inherent tensions between a free press and a strong military surfaced early on.  
When James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights to the House of Representatives, he 
included two separate amendments that reflected his intent to protect the press from all 
governmental encroachments:
The People shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to 
publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great 
7 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 70 (1998) [hereinafter 
REHNQUIST]. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774-75 (1950).
8bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable. . . . No State shall violate the equal rights 
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.8
During debate in the House of Representatives, Madison argued that “the liberty of the 
press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of the government.”  Although the House 
passed both amendments, the Senate rejected them.  Few details of its debate were reported;  the 
language that the Senators finally agreed upon would eventually form the basis for the First 
Amendment: “That Congress shall make no law, abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press…”9
The War of 1812
A few decades later, America once again found itself having to balance the protection of 
individual freedoms against the necessity of national security.   During the War of 1812, after 
British forces captured an American position near New Orleans, General Andrew Jackson 
declared martial law.  Although the war officially ended with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent 
in December of 1814, Jackson, because he felt that continuation of martial law would help 
maintain order in New Orleans, tried to silence reports that the treaty had been signed.  
However, a journalist named Louis Louailler reported the cessation of hostilities and 
called for an end to martial law.  General Jackson had him arrested.  Louailler, charged with 
8
 There were five versions of the amendment: the one introduced by Madison; a new version by a House select 
committee (which was passed by the House unchanged); the Senate's initial revision; a second Senate draft resulting 
from a floor amendment; and the final version produced by a conference committee. The various texts can be found 
in 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 451 (1789) (J. Gales ed. 1834).
9
 Although this language may not reflect the Founders’ intention to ensure that the press be free from all
governmental restrictions – executive, judicial, or legislative –  at that point in history the legislature was viewed as 
the primary source of federal power, and use of the word “Congress” may be interpreted to mean that the press not 
be limited by any of the branches of government. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 
1789), in 1 J. MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 492 (Philadelphia 1865).  See also
Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156 (1986); and Kelly, Criminal 
Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295, 306 (1958).
9provoking rebellion among the troops, was tried and acquitted by a military court, but was not 
released until Jackson lifted his proclamation of martial law in March of 1815.10
Practically all of the other military trials of civilians during wartime resulted in 
convictions.11
The Civil War
Perhaps the first big test of American civil liberties came during the Civil War.  
Most of the substantial opposition to the war was effectively controlled by way of 
executive orders rendered by President Lincoln – who reasoned that, since the expressed threat to 
the Union was military in nature, it could be addressed in the same way as the military conduct 
of the war.12
The President believed that survival of the Union rested in part on security for the 
nation’s capital in Washington, D.C.  Railroad bridges north of Baltimore had already been 
burned. Lincoln summoned troops from the northeast to Washington and, in April of 1861, 
authorized the commanding general of the U.S. Army, Winfield Scott, to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus (that is, the right of a suspect to be brought promptly before a judge who could 
determine the sufficiency of the evidence against him) wherever “necessary…for the public 
safety” along any military line between Philadelphia and Washington.13 Seeking to guard against 
further destruction of the railroad line through Baltimore, Lincoln declared that political 
criminals could be tried before military tribunals.  By October of 1861, suspension of habeas 
corpus had been expanded to “anywhere between Bangor, Maine, and Washington;” by August 
10 REHNQUIST at 70.
11
 Id. See also Eric L. Muller, All the Themes But One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1418 (1999).
12
  Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, U. OF PA. L. REV. 975 (1968).
13 REHNQUIST at 25.
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of 1862, suspension of the writ was nationwide and extended to both draft resisters and “persons 
arrested for disloyal practices.”14  In addition, the postal service put restrictions on what it 
deemed “treasonable correspondence.”15
In September of 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation providing that persons 
“discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice 
affording aid and comfort to rebels” should be subject to “martial law and liable to trial and 
punishment by courts-martial or military commissions.”16 Thus, suspects were denied access to 
civil courts and subjected to military trial procedures on charges not otherwise allowable. At 
about the same time, another executive order directed U.S. marshals and local police chiefs to 
arrest and imprison “any person or persons who may be engaged, or in any way giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United States.”17 As a result, 
more than 13,000 Americans were jailed without trial.18
The lawfulness of Lincoln’s new system of justice was soon tested in civil courts. In late 
May of 1861, a man named John Merryman was arrested and imprisoned for participating in the 
destruction of the railroad bridges during a riot in Baltimore.  His attorney applied for a writ of 
habeas corpus from Chief Justice Roger Taney, but military officials refused to produce 
Merryman.  Justice Taney ruled that the President, acting alone, did not have the authority to 
14 See REHNQUIST at 60.
15 See H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT, 221-47 (1966); J. RANDALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951); D. SPRAGUE, FREEDOM UNDER LINCOLN (1965).  See 
also 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38 (3d ed. 
1967).
16 REHNQUIST at 60.
17 Id. at 75, 83-85.
18
 Emerson, supra note  at 980.
11
suspend habeas corpus – reasoning that since the federal courts were open and functioning, 
civilians could only be detained and tried by civilian courts.19
President Lincoln responded in a message sent to a special session of Congress: while the 
Constitution did not express which branch of government could suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, he argued, when Congress was not in session during an emergency such authority was 
vested in the President.  The writ expressed “such extreme tenderness of the citizens’ liberty,” he 
argued, that it was dangerous to national security.  During a period of war the president could not 
follow Taney’s advice, he said, and allow “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated.”20
As it turned out Merryman never did have a trial, but he was eventually released from 
prison on bail.  
Nevertheless, the administration continued to limit free speech by arresting those who 
expressed sympathy for the South.  The State Department went so far as to keep a record book 
entitled “Arrests for Disloyalty.”  Even more extreme, in the summer of 1861, a dozen or more 
legislators were arrested to prevent them from enacting an ordinance of secession for the state of 
Maryland.21
Nor did the press escape governmental regulation.  
Although reporters continued to pursue news of the war, and many of them had access to 
the front lines, military generals could exclude them either temporarily or permanently.  Indeed 
19 Id. at 26-38.
20
 Lincoln in a Special Session Message to Congress (July 4, 1861), 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 25 (J. Richardson, comp.). Lincoln was responding to Chief Justice 
Taney's conclusion that only Congress is authorized under the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
“when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 9; see Ex parte
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861). 
21 See REHNQUIST at 45-6.
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at one time or another they were routinely banished by both Northern and Southern generals.22
For example, General Sherman expelled every newspaper correspondent from the lines and 
threatened “summary punishment” to anyone who would reveal his troops’ movements.23
Similarly, military censors exercised their authority – shutting down, for example, the Chicago 
Times for its attacks on President Lincoln.24
The Lincoln Administration was especially concerned about the New York press, because 
of its size and influence.  While the Times, Tribune and Herald, all supported the Union war 
effort, other newspapers did not.  A grand jury investigated over a hundred Northern papers 
listed by the New York Journal of Commerce as opposed to “the present unholy war,” and found 
five of them to be offensive.  As a result, the Postmaster General ordered them excluded from 
circulation.  The owner of the New York News fought the ban by circulating his paper privately.  
The government responded by ordering U.S. marshals to seize all copies of the paper, even 
arresting a newsboy.  Eventually, the newspaper failed.25
Meanwhile, the pro-war New York papers did nothing to support their competition – nor 
was there any outcry about abridgment of their First Amendment rights. On September 24, 
22
 J. MATHEWS, REPORTING THE WARS  34 (1957) at 80-81; M. STEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE STORY OF AMERICAN WAR 
CORRESPONDENTS 21 (1968) at 18; B. WEISBERGER. REPORTERS FOR THE UNION  105-06 (1953).
23
  Randall, The Newspaper Problem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy During the Civil War, 23 AM. HIST. REV.
303, 318 (1918) (citing S. BOWMAN, SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS 447-48 (1865)). Apparently the order 
continued for some time; Sherman had a reporter excluded from all Union lines for violating the order in 1863. Id. at 
318-19. Eight correspondents accompanied General Sherman on his march through Georgia to the sea, however. P. 
KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY – FROM CRIMEA TO VIETNAM: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS A HERO, 
PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER 28 (1975). 
24 Everette E. Dennis, et al., The Media At War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict, GANNETT FOUND REP.,
June, 1991, at 9.  On June 1, 1863, General Ambrose Burnside deployed troops to stop publication of the Chicago 
Times. Kenan Heise, Banned Books Week Carries on Free Speech Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1985, § 14, at 38. 
Lincoln revoked the order as soon as he learned of Burnside's promulgation. Id. See also Paul G. Cassell, 
Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada, and “Off-the-Record Wars,” 
73 GEO. L. J. 934 (1985) and C. Robert Zelnick, The Press and National Security: Military Secrets and First 
Amendment Values, 1 J.NAT’L SECURITY L. 21, 23 (1997).
25 REHNQUIST at 46, 63-64.
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1862 – two days after the publication of the Emancipation Proclamation – President Lincoln 
himself issued another directive which provided that anyone caught “discouraging volunteer
enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to 
rebels” would be subject to “martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or 
military commissions…”26 Six months later, in mid-April of 1863, General Ambrose Burnside 
(commander of the Department of Ohio) promulgated an order which stated in part:  “The habit 
of declaring sympathies with the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this department.  Persons 
committing such offenses will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above stated [by 
military commissions] or sent beyond our lines and into the lines of their friends.”27
That same month a man named Clement Vallandigham, speaking at a rally at the state 
Democratic convention in Columbus, Ohio, criticized Burnside’s order and denied the 
government’s right to try civilians before military commissions.  He traveled around the state, 
defending the right of the people to assemble to debate the administration’s war policy.  General 
Burnside discovered Vallandigham’s itinerary, and sent a dozen “observers” to take notes.28
When Vallandigham returned to his home several days later, he was arrested and charged with 
“publicly expressing . . .sympathies for those in arms against the Government of the United 
States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the 
power of the Government in its effort to suppress the unlawful rebellion.”  The charge went on to 
say that Vallandigham had declared that “the present war is . . . wicked, cruel and unnecessary . . 
26 Id. at 60.
27 Id. at 63.
28
 Id. at 65-66.
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., one not waged for the preservation of the Union, but for the purpose of crushing our liberty and 
to erect a despotism.  A war for the freedom of the blacks and enslavement of the whites.”29
The next morning Vallandigham was tried before a military commission comprised 
entirely of General Burnside’s subordinates.  Not surprisingly, he was found guilty of violating 
the General Order.  He was sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war.  His petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus (arguing that it had not been suspended in Ohio) was denied by the 
United States District Court.30  Vallandigham petitioned the Supreme Court to review the 
decision.  In February of 1864, the Court refused, holding that it had no jurisdiction to review 
decisions of a military commission.31
President Lincoln came under heavy criticism for what had become known as the 
Vallandigham Affair.  He attempted to ameliorate the situation by changing Vallandigham’s 
sentence from imprisonment for the duration of the war to banishment “beyond the Union lines” 
into the Confederacy.32  But both “Peace Democrats” and “War Democrats” drafted a letter to 
the President denouncing the arrest and trial as a violation of Vallandigham’s constitutional 
rights.  Lincoln defended the trial, arguing that the country was facing a rebellion and was 
29 Id. at 66.
30 Id. at 66-67.
31 Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wallace) 243 (1863).
Even Justice Rehnquist, who generally advocates judicial deference to the military in times of war, 
questions this result:  
Vallandigham was not only tried by a military commission, rather than a jury, but the charge upon which 
he was tried was that he violated an order issued by Burnside—an order that forbade the expression of 
sympathy for the enemy.  A criminal trial in a civil court must be based on a charge that the defendant engaged 
in conduct prohibited by an Act of Congress (in a federal court), or by an act of a state legislature (in a state 
court). Burnside’s order had no such pedigree; it was not even based on an orderof the President or the 
Secretary of War.  It originated with Ambrose Burnside, the commanding general of the military district of 
Ohio.  Members of the armed forces are naturally accustomed to being governed by such orders.  But 
Vallandigham was not a soldier; he was a civilian. . . .The justification for convicting Vallandigham was 
Lincoln’s proclamationof September, 1862, invoking martial law.  But what is martial law?  Much has been 
written both before and after this time in an effort to describe this regime, but in fact the nation had only 
limited exposure to it between the close of the Revolutionary War and the Civil War.
32 Id. at 63
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therefore under military rule; he characterized Vallandigham’s speech as a direct threat to the 
military, undermining the effectiveness of the draft and thereby of the army itself.  
“Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts,” asked Lincoln, “while I must 
not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?”33
Lincoln’s defense of his actions was not addressed to the constitutional lawyers or 
professors but to the general public, which may explain how such an infringement on a citizen’s 
freedom of speech could occur.   The question remains whether Lincoln’s actions would pass 
constitutional muster had they occurred fifty years later, when the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence began to take shape.34
Lincoln also prohibited any trade with the Confederacy, and required all individuals 
desiring such commerce to apply for a permit from the Department of the Treasury.  
Subsequently, although the Mississippi River was an important western trade route to both the 
North and the South, in the summer of 1861 both sides took steps to stop commercial traffic.35
The Union’s trade policies shifted frequently from prohibition to encouragement, with the 
result that individual civil liberties could easily be lost in the shuffle.
For example, after Union forces occupied Memphis, the town was soon flooded by a 
wave of northern merchants, many of them who happened to be Jewish.  Union military leaders 
expressed their frustration with trade that they felt undermined their military goals.36  In response 
33 REHNQUIST at 73.
34 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 298 [NEED YEAR] (citing 
Schenck v. United States., 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).  
35
 Joseph H. Parks, A Confederate Trade Center Under Federal Occupation: Memphis, 1862 to 1865, 7 J § HIST. 
289, 290 (1941).
36 See Letters from Ulysses S. Grant to Mary Grant (Dec. 15, 1862) and to Christopher Wolcott (Dec. 17, 1862) in 
JOHN SIMON, ED. 7 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT 43-4 and 56 (1979).
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Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Union forces, issued his now-famous General Order 
Number 11:
I. The Jews, as a class, violating every regulation of trade established by 
the Treasury Department, and also Department orders, are hereby 
expelled from the Department.
II. Within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order by Post 
Commanders, they will see that all of this class of people are furnished 
with passes and required to leave, and any one returning after such 
notification, will be arrested and held in confinement until an 
opportunity occurs of sending them out as  prisoners unless furnished 
with permits from these Head Quarters.
III. No permits will be given these people to visit Head Quarters for the 
purpose of making personal application for trade permits.37
Jewish community leaders complained bitterly and tried to get the measure rescinded.  
They sent a letter to Lincoln protesting Grant’s “inhuman order, the carrying out of which would 
be the grossest violation of the Constitution and our rights as citizens under it, (and) which will 
place us…as outlaws before the whole world.”  The leader of the delegation, Cesar J. Kaskel, 
traveled to Washington, D.C. to speak with the president himself.38
Lincoln gave Kaskel and audience, and was persuaded that General Order Number 11 
should be rescinded.  As the President later put it, he “did not like to hear a class or nationality 
condemned on account of a few sinners.”39  (During his subsequent campaign for the presidency, 
Grant received numerous letters asking him to explain General Order Number 11.  He expressed 
great regret about having issued it, and said he was wrong to have done so.)40
In October 1864, Union General Alvin Hovey ordered the arrest of a group of men led by 
Lambdin Milligan for conspiracy against the United States.  They were charged with giving “aid 
and comfort to rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation of the laws of 
37
 General Order No. 11 (Dec. 17, 1862), in SIMON, ED., GRANT PAPERS 50.
38 BERTRAM KORN,  AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE CIVIL WAR 121-22 (1951).
39
 Id. at 125.   This episode is not mentioned by Rehnquist.  See supra notes _____ and accompanying text.  See 
generally Muller, supra note 9 at 1421-23.
40 See 7 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, DECEMBER 9, 1862 – MARCH 31, 1863, 50 (John Y. Simon ed., 1979).
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war.”41  Milligan and the others were tried and convicted – largely on the basis of evidence 
which would have been of questionable admissibility in a civil court – and were sentenced to 
hang.  Their counsel filed petitions for habeas corpus, contending that a military commission 
could not impose sentences on civilians living in a state not at war.  
The petition found its way to the Supreme Court.42  In Ex Parte Milligan, the government 
argued that the military commission was empowered by martial law, and that its decisions could 
be reviewed only by military authority.  The Bill of Rights, it said, represented “peace provisions 
of the Constitution, and, like all other conventional and legislative laws and enactments, are 
silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the supreme law.”43
The petitioners urged that the government’s claim be rejected, arguing that martial law 
could be imposed only by necessity, and even then only by Congress.   In April of 1866, the 
Court ordered that the writ should issue, holding that a military commission had no jurisdiction 
to try and sentence Milligan and his co-conspirators.  Habeas corpus could be suspended, said 
the Court, only in accordance with Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution:  “Martial law cannot 
arise from a threatened invasion.  The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, 
such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”44  As the petitioners 
had requested, the Court denied the government’s contention that the Bill of Rights was 
suspended in time of war or rebellion.45
41 See generally Rehnquist at 123-27 (citing U.S. v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)). Hudson held that “the 
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it and declare the court that 
shall have jurisdiction of the offense” prior to prosecution in federal court. In effect, Hudson abolished federal 
common law crimes in the United States.
42
 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, at 1 (1866).  The procedural history is briefly explained before the opinion begins.
43
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44 Id. at 127.
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Except for the brief Spanish-American War, which lasted but a few months and was not 
fought on American soil, for almost fifty years after the Civil War the United States was at peace 
and threats to civil liberties virtually non-existent.
The Twentieth Century
World War I
Restrictions on anti-war expression during the first World War were both widespread and
intensive. 
Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in June of 1914, a 
month of threats and counter-threats took place between the Allied and Central Powers, 
culminating in Germany’s invasion of France in August of 1914.  The initial reaction of the 
American public was one of isolationism. There had, after all, been no invasion of or attack on 
American soil. Even after German submarines sank the Lusitania and three U. S. merchant-
marine vessels without warning, and President Woodrow Wilson (with Congress’s approval 
declared war, public opinion was divided.46
Wilson was critical of foreign-born American citizens who opposed the “pro-British 
foreign policy.”  In a message to Congress on December 7, 1915, he said:
The gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been 
uttered within our own borders.  There are citizens of the United 
States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed by 
our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and 
the time, had it not gone out of its way to declare that Congress had no authority to do that which it never tried to 
do.”  REHNQUIST at 137. 
46Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The Aftermath of 
September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 80-81 (2002).  
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opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty 
into the very arteries of our national life.47
Shortly thereafter, in June of 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act.  Together with 
various amendments embodied in the Sedition Act, it criminalized any interference with military 
operations as well as any acts causing “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty.”  
The Acts also banned from the mail any material “advocating treason, insurrection, or forcible 
resistance to any law of the United States.”48
These laws were vigorously enforced, resulting in substantial suppression of speech.  For 
example, it became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of bond issues, to state that 
conscription was unconstitutional (though the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid), to say 
that the sinking of merchant ships was legal,  to urge that a referendum should have preceded our 
declaration of war, or to declare that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ.  In addition, 
people were punished for criticizing the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A.  Under the Minnesota 
Espionage Act it was held a crime to discourage women from knitting by suggesting that “no 
soldier ever sees those socks.” Almost two thousand prosecutions were brought under the federal 
statutes, and there were many others under state legislation.49
It was through these cases that the Supreme Court’s first thorough analysis of the First 
Amendment began,  a jurisprudential evolution that has continued to the present day.  
Before 1917, the Court had never had occasion to decide a case in which it was claimed 
that the federal government had violated the First Amendment by abridging the freedoms of 
speech or press. The Espionage Act changed that status quo.  Although no decisions were 
47
 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 150, 151 (Albert Shaw ed., 1924). Wilson made similar 
statements during his 1916 presidential campaign. Id.
48
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1717.
49 Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 51-52 (1941).
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rendered until after the war was over, in each case thereafter the Court saw fit to reject various 
First Amendment claims, usually by applying the “clear-and-present-danger” test.
The first decision to invoke that standard was Schenck  v. United States.  Together with 
other members of the Socialist Party (of which he was general secretary), Schenck had 
distributed a leaflet opposing the war and the draft, some copies of which had reached men who 
had been conscripted.  Schenck and his comrades were indicted under the Espionage Act for 
conspiring to obstruct recruiting and cause insubordination in the armed forces.  
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking for the Court on the First Amendment issue, 
wrote: “It may well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not 
confined to previous restraints.”50  But he made it clear that the First Amendment did not protect 
all utterances.  “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . .The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”51
In upholding the convictions, Justice Holmes explained:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants 
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within 
their constitutional rights.  But the character of every act depends 
upon the circumstances in which it is done… When a nation is at 
war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so 
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected 
by any constitutional right.52
50
 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
51 Id. at 52 (emphasis supplied).
52 Id.
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Other cases went even further in sanctioning curtailment of wartime expression under the 
Espionage Act of 1917.  Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist leader, was prosecuted for creating 
insubordination in the armed forces on the basis of a speech in which he denounced the war as a 
capitalist plot and supported fellow socialists who had been convicted of resisting the draft.  
Apparently his most extreme statement was, “You need to know that you are fit for something 
better than slavery and cannon fodder.”  Debs was given a ten-year sentence.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the conviction, finding that the speech was 
designed to obstruct recruitment, because its meaning was “so express” that that goal would be 
“its natural and intended effect.”53
The officers of a German-language newspaper were found guilty of violating the 
provision against false news reports in publishing articles slanted toward the German position.  
Victor Berger’s Milwaukee Leader was denied second-class mailing privileges for printing 
editorials, strongly pro-German in tone, attacking the war and the draft.54
Meanwhile, on the battlefields, reporters’ access to the front lines was rare and news 
reports were heavily censored.  This was due in part to the creation of the Committee on Public 
Information in 1917 by the State, Navy, and War Departments.  News correspondents in Europe 
were required to be accredited, and such status could be revoked for violating censorship 
regulations.  For example, the press was not permitted to report on the failure of supplies to reach 
American troops in Europe, because the War Department believed that such stories would 
disturb the nation’s confidence in the war effort.55
53
 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919).
54 U.S. ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
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In 1919, after a terrorist bomb exploded at the home of U.S. Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer, the Justice Department responded by launching the infamous Palmer Raids, in 
which thousands of immigrants across the country were rounded up and hundred of them 
deported – not for their involvement in the attack, but for their political associations.56
In Abrams v. United States, the Court held that even advocating a labor strike could be 
unlawful under the 1918 Sedition Act, because of the risk that it would stop production of 
munitions.  The defendants had thrown leaflets, calling for a general work stoppage, out of a 
window and onto the street.  The Court stuck firmly to the position that any interference with the 
war effort could validly be suppressed – although it was in this case that Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis began to express dissenting views regarding wartime speech.57
In 1917, the Espionage Act was also challenged for denying second-class mailing 
privileges to any newspaper violating its provisions.  Postmaster General Albert Burleson 
determined that various articles published in the Milwaukee Leader were intended to interfere 
wrote a series of articles on the issue for the New York World. Id. at 130.  See also E. CROZIER, AMERICAN 
REPORTERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-1918, 183 (1959).  
56 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Diamond v. Uhl, 266 F. 34, 39- 40 (2d Cir. 1920) (upholding deportation of Italian 
non-citizen for advocating assassination of public officials and unlawful destruction of property); United States ex 
rel. Rakics v. Uhl, 266 F. 646, 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1920) (affirming deportation of Hungarian immigrant belonging to 
IWW); Guiney v. Bonham, 261 F. 582, 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1919) (denying writ of habeas corpus to British 
Columbian native charged with advocating unlawful destruction of property). A notable exception to this pattern 
occurred in Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110, 112 (D. Mont. 1920), where the court granted a writ of habeas corpus and 
decried the unlawful conduct of the government raiders who “perpetrated a reign of terror, violence, and crime 
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with the success of United States military operations and obstruct the recruitment and enlistment 
services, and revoked the paper’s second-class mailing privileges.58
The Supreme Court upheld another conviction brought under the Espionage Act in Pierce 
v. United States.  The defendants had been charged with distributing anti-war pamphlets entitled 
The Price We Pay, which stated that “our entry into [the war] was determined by the certainty 
that if the allies do not win, J.P. Morgan’s loans to the allies will be repudiated, and those 
American investors who bit on his promises would be hooked.”59  Justices Brandeis and Holmes 
dissented:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions 
through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved, 
if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be 
construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law-
merely, because the argument presented seems to those exercising 
judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, 
mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate 
in language.60
World War II
         Although the assertion lingers that during World War II there was no overt effort by the 
government to suppress public criticism of wartime policy,61 the evidence suggests otherwise.62
In June of 1940, for example, Congress made it a crime for anyone –
with intent to interfere with, impair, and influence the loyalty, 
morale, and discipline of the military and naval forces of the 
United States [to] advise, counsel, urge, and cause insubordination, 
58
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disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty by members of the military 
and naval forces of the United State, [or] to distribute and cause to 
be distributed written and printed matter advising, counseling, and 
urging insubordination, or to conspire to commit any of the said 
prohibited acts.63
Even before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and America’s formal entry into World 
War II, the America First Committee – well-known for its outward disapproval of United States 
involvement – found itself under grand-jury investigation for opposing American engagement.64
David Dellinger and his anti-war organization People’s Peace Now were harassed and 
investigated for opposing the war.  The Black press also found itself threatened by J. Edgar 
Hoover and Attorney General Francis Biddle for publishing articles critical of the war effort.65
In October of 1941, two months before the attack at Pearl Harbor, the commander of the 
Military Department of Hawaii, Lt.Gen.Walter Short, urged passage of a state law to grant the 
governor extraordinary powers in the event of war.    The territorial governor of Hawaii, Joseph 
Poindexter, called a special session of the legislature, which quickly enacted the Hawaii Defense 
Act.66  That law implemented Section 67 of the Hawaii Organic Act, the charter of the territory 
enacted by Congress in 1900, which provided that the Governor “may in case of rebellion or 
invasion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus or place the territory or any part thereof under martial law until communication 
may be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.”67
63
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Within a few hours of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Poindexter signed an order 
placing the territory under martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus.68  General Short 
assisted him in this effort by issuing his own proclamation, which declared his intention to push 
for legislation that would establish censorship and regulate blackouts, meetings, possession of 
arms, and the sale of intoxicating liquors.  Offenders would be sentenced by military tribunals or 
held in custody until the civil courts could resume their normal functions.69
The Supreme Court also confronted the question of civil liberties for non-citizens – an 
question very much in issue today – in deciding whether captured German saboteurs could 
constitutionally challenge the President’s power to order them tried by a military tribunal.  The 
petitioners were eight Germans caught as they tried to enter the country for the purpose of “. . .
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations under the law of war.”70  They argued 
that under the Constitution they had a right to demand a jury trial at common law in the civil 
courts.71
The Court held that the President had authority under the Constitution to order the 
petitioners tried before a military tribunal as unlawful belligerents under the Articles of War.   In 
a per curiam opinion (which kept the facts from the public), the Court unanimously found in 
favor of the government.72
68
 Harry N. Scheiber and Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Century Retrospect on Marital Law in 
Hawaii, 1941-1946, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 477 (1997). President Roosevelt approved  this action on December 9. 
69 Id. at 490, 502. In 1942, military authorities arrested Harry White, a stockbroker in Honolulu, and charged him 
with embezzling stock belonging to another person.  He was tried before a military provost court.  White’s objection 
to the court’s jurisdiction, and his demand for a jury trial, were both denied.  He was subsequently convicted and 
sentenced to five years in prison. Ex parte White, 66 F. Supp. 982, 984 (D. Haw. 1944).
70 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942).
71 Id.
72 Id.
26
At the subsequent military trial all eight men were convicted and sentenced to death.  
Five days later six of them were executed by electric chair.  The Supreme Court later issued a 
full opinion later, but not before several behind-the-scenes exchanges in which Justice 
Frankfurter exhorted his colleagues to yield to the President as a matter of patriotism and penned 
a bizarre soliloquy with the already-executed men: “You damned scoundrels have a helluvacheek 
to ask for a writ. . . . You’ve done enough mischief already without leaving the seeds of a bitter 
conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress. . . . [Y]our bodies will be rotting in 
lime . . . [and] remain in . . . custody and be damned.”  He also encouraged his brethren not to 
engage in “abstract constitutional discussions” but to leave any unresolved issues to be decided 
“during peacetime.”73
Equally shocking, perhaps, was a statement attributed to President Franklin Roosevelt 
who, it has often been suggested, did not order bombardment of the Nazi death camps because he 
was worried about being perceived as fighting a war for the Jews.  He is said to have told two 
members of his cabinet (Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau, who was Jewish, and Leo 
Crowley, director of the Office of Economic Welfare, who was Catholic, both of whom were 
urging him to intervene on behalf of the Jews) that “you should remember, this is a Protestant 
country, and you Jews and Catholics are here under sufferance.  You have to go along with 
everything I want.”74
73
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The Japanese Internment Camps
The most serious abrogation of civil liberties during wartime – and perhaps in all of U.S. 
history – involved the internment of the Japanese-Americans during World War II.  This long 
and painful episode provides a useful basis for analyzing the validity of “military necessity” as a 
justification for limiting individual rights under the Constitution.  
Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese-Americans were the targets of racism.  
In 1905, an “Asiatic Exclusion League” was formed to keep Japanese and Koreans from 
immigrating into the United States.  In 1907, President Roosevelt negotiated the so-called 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement,” under which the Japanese government would not issue passports to 
people seeking to live in America, but the United States would permit parents, wives, and 
children of laborers already in the U. S. to immigrate.  Similar racism was reflected in the Webb-
Hartley law of1913, which limited leases to three years to aliens that were unable to become 
citizens.75
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the newspapers were filled with propaganda of Japanese 
subversion and traitors.76  One Honolulu newspaper reported that Japanese-American farmers 
had planted their tomatoes in a configuration that would point to American airfields around Pearl 
Harbor.77  Although no Japanese planes were ever sited, 1,400 rounds of ammunition were fired 
at supposed Japanese enemy planes.78
75 WAUGE, ISAMI, ET. AL., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, FIVE VIEWS, AN ETHNIC 
HISTORIC SITE SURVEY FOR CALIFORNIA (1998), http://www.cr.gov/history/online_books/5views/5views4.htm#top. 
76 MIKE WRIGHT, WHAT THEY DIDN’T TEACH YOU ABOUT WORLD WAR II 165 (Presidio, 1998). 
77 Id. at 166.
78 Id. at 165.
28
In February of 1942, General John DeWitt, recommended to Secretary of War, Henry L. 
Stimson to evacuate all west coast Nikkei (Issei and Nisei collectively):79
[The Japanese race] is an enemy race and while many second and third generation 
Japanese born on American soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have 
become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are undiluted. . . . The very fact that no 
sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that 
such action will be taken.80
DeWitt had little sympathy for the argument that few if any of the Nikkei posed a security 
threat.  In his words, “A Jap is a Jap.”81  Roosevelt told Stimson to “go ahead [and do what he] 
thought the best”82 and shortly thereafter, the President signed Executive Order 9066.83  This 
directive gave DeWitt the legal power to exclude any and all persons, citizens or aliens, from 
designated areas on the West Coast.84  Subsequently about 112,000 people, including 70,000 
American citizens, were ordered to “relocation centers.”85
Internment camps, which the government called “relocation centers,” were established in 
Manzanar and Tule Lake, California; Topaz, Utah; Rivers, Arizona; Heart Mountain Wyoming.86
Privacy was non-existent in the internment camps.  A family was given a 20- by 25-foot space.87
79
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Toilets were communal; diarrhea was common, caused by contaminated water.88 Each internee 
received a straw mattress, blanket, and very little else for space that resembled a horse stall.89
Justice Rehnquist’s description of the internees’ experience itself is misleadingly brief: 
“There was no physical brutality, but there were certainly severe hardships – physical removal 
from the place where one lived, often forced sale of houses and businesses, and harsh living 
conditions in the Spartan quarters of the internment centers.”90
Although the internment caps were not as harsh as those seen in Nazi Germany, their 
impetus was similar: the Japanese-Americans were being punished for being born into an 
unpopular race.91   Physical abuse was not uncommon.  In 1943, as a response to riots, internees 
at Tule Lake were beaten, kicked, and sprayed with tear gas.92  After the war, each internee was 
given $25 and a train ticket to the place he once called home.93
For their part, the interned Nikkei could not understand why the government had placed 
them in detention camps, much less behind barbed wire.  But even more puzzling to them was 
why in 1944 several hundred Nisei interns were ordered out of the relocation centers and into the 
U.S. Army – the same Army that continued to guard their parents and their brothers and sisters. 
Why would the same government that had evacuated them as military risks now want them to 
serve?  
At least some of the incentive to draft Nisei out of the camps appears to have come from 
a segment of the Japanese-American community itself.  In June 1942, the War Department 
88 Id.
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changed the selective service classification of the Nisei-American citizens all to IV-C, the 
category for “aliens not acceptable to the armed forces.”94  Almost immediately, an organization 
called the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) began lobbying the government to allow 
Nisei to volunteer and join the military in order to demonstrate their loyalty.95  This idea 
appealed to Dillon Myer, the director of the civilian War Relocation Authority that had been 
created in November of 1942 to administer the interment camps.96  He too began pressing for the 
right of Nisei to volunteer.97
In January 1943, the War Department agreed – with the proviso that volunteers be 
screened to determine if their loyalty was questionable.  A questionnaire was distributed to 
young men in all ten of the relocation centers and soon expanded to include all evacuees, Issei 
and Nisei.  The four-page survey, entitled “Application for Leave Clearance,”included two 
pointed questions:
#27.  Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat 
duty wherever ordered?
 #28.  Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and 
faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, 
and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other 
foreign government, power or organization?98
The Nisei, having been interned for almost a full year now, were concerned that a “yes” 
answer to Question 27 would be tantamount to volunteering to join the armed forces and leaving 
their parents and siblings to fend for themselves in the camps.  They were also chagrined by 
94
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Question 28: how could they “forswear” an allegiance to the Japanese Emperor to whom they 
had never sworn allegiance in the first place? 
But the loyalty questionnaires did ultimately serve to cull volunteer Nisei, many of whom 
served on the segregated 442d Regimental Combat Team.  As stories of their bravery in battle 
made their way back to the United States late in 1943, the JACL began lobbying the War 
Department to reopen the draft to the Nisei as well, and to force into the service the 
overwhelming majority of their compatriots who had no intention of answering the army’s call 
for volunteers.99  By mid-February of 1944, induction notices began to appear in the mail at all 
ten relocation centers, including Tule Lake.100
The drafting of the Nisei were greeted in the camps with a measure of disbelief. Issei
parents, who had already lost their homes, their livelihoods, their security, and their dignity, were 
now to lose their sons as well.   Residents of all of the camps complained about the unfairness of 
the government’s decision simultaneously to incarcerate and to draft the very same community 
of people.101
Although most of the young men who received draft notices complied with their orders 
and showed up for their physical exams, some draftees refused to comply.   If we are loyal 
enough to serve in the army, they asked, what have we been doing in concentration camps for the 
last year and a half?102   The resisters were quickly indicted for failing to comply with the draft, 
99
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arrested by the FBI, and taken to jail.  All of them found themselves charged with felonies and 
facing the possibility of additional years of incarceration.103
Their cases came to trial in the summer and fall of 1944.  Most of the federal district 
judges hearing them ran perfunctory trials, and meted out sentences of from two to five years in 
prison.104
One notable exception occurred in July of 1944.   Judge Louis H. Goodman of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California was assigned the prosecution of 
twenty-seven young men from the Tule Lake Relocation Center who had refused to show up for 
their physicals. 
The resisters and their court-appointed attorneys faced an uphill battle. Public feeling was 
strongly against them; the local newspaper referred to them as “the Japanese” or “American-born 
Japs.”105
The defendants were advised by their attorneys to plead guilty as charged, which they 
did.106  Judge Goodman, however, asked another attorney to file a motion to quash the 
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Enough Food, Japs Complain in Jail Here”:
Not enough ricee – that wasn’t exactly the plaint of the Japanese prisoners in the county jail today; their 
complaint was “Not enough mealee.” According to the custom of all county jails, only two meals a day are served to 
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16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), noted in 81 HARV. L. REV. 685 (1968).
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indictment as violative of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.  He also filed a motion to 
withdraw the guilty pleas that had already been entered.107
Unlike every other federal judge that summer, who had tried the Nisei draft resisters and 
convicted them,  Judge Goodman bluntly dismissed all charges against the defendants.  The “war 
powers vested in the executive,” he said, “may be sufficient constitutional justification” for the 
internment itself.  But “[n]o such dangers are the basis for the prosecution of defendants for 
refusing to be inducted.”108
“It does not follow,” said Judge Goodman, “that because the war power may allow the 
detention of the defendant at Tule Lake, the guaranties of the Bill of Rights and other 
Constitutional provisions are abrogated by the existence of war.”  Applying the basic test of due 
process, Goodman found it shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be confined on 
the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in 
the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion. “The issue raised by this 
motion must be resolved in the light of the traditional and historic Anglo-American approach to 
the time-honored doctrine of due process.  It must not give way to overzealousness in an attempt 
to reach, via the criminal process, those whom we may regard as undesirable citizens.”109
The government did not appeal Goodman’s decision.  The defendants were returned to 
their relocation center where, despite their victory in court, they resumed their lives behind 
barbed wire.110
107 Id. at 823.
108 United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F Supp 716-19 (N D Cal 1944).
109 Id.
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During the internment years, other legislative actions likewise affected thousands of 
Japanese- Americans.  In 1943 California passed a statute which prohibited “aliens ineligible to 
citizenship” from earning their living as commercial fishermen in coastal waters.111  Well after 
the war ended, Congress saw fit to provide partial restitution for losses and damages resulting 
from the internment.   The Evacuation Claims Act, however, was not a cure-all.  While losses by 
Japanese-Americans were estimated to be around $400 million, only ten percent of this amount 
was disbursed to former internees.  
In 1981 Congress established a special commission to investigate the historical, legal, 
economical, and psychological impacts of the forced internment of over 120,000 persons of 
Japanese ancestry.112
111
 One fisherman’s suit went all the way to the  Supreme Court, which ruled that the statute was unconstitutional.
Other discriminatory measures were more subtle. In 1944, a federal statute amended the Nationality Act of 1940 to 
permit U.S. citizens to renounce citizenship during wartime. The Department of Justice had intended that the law 
encourage leaders of disturbances at the Tule Lake Segregation Center to renounce their citizenship, therefore 
making themselves eligible for further detention when the camps were dismantled. Instead, 5,522 renunciations 
came from Japanese-Americans (5,371 were from persons confined at Tule Lake), rather than the several hundred 
expected from pro-Japan elements. When the concentration camps were closed, many internees regretted renouncing 
their U.S. citizenship, citing coercion, intimidation, and fears of hostility by the dominant society. Lawsuits to re-
validate citizenship continued until 1965, including Abo v. Clark (77 F. Supp. 806), which returned U.S. citizenship 
to 4,315 Nisei.
Japanese-Americans likewise found it difficult to defend their land holdings during World War II. A total 
of 79 cases were tried under the Alien Land Law of 1913 (including 59 after the war). The first challenge to the 
Alien Land Law was Harada v. State of California, in which the Superior Court of Riverside County declared in 
1918 that Jukichi Harada could purchase property in the name of his children, who were U.S. citizens though still 
minors. Subsequent court cases in other jurisdictions had differing results, some ruling that minor children could not 
own property.  Two escheat cases had particular significance in invalidating the Alien Land Law. The case of 
Oyama v. State of California in 1948 determined that non-citizen parents could purchase land as gifts for citizen 
children. The Fujii v. State of California case in 1952 resulted in the Alien Land Law of 1913 being declared 
unconstitutional. Legal obstacles to land purchases by Asians were thus removed.
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 Japanese-Americans have also endured informal discriminatory practices. In 1945, a Japanese-American family 
challenged the constitutionality of segregated schools, and the Los Angeles County Superior Court concurred that 
segregation on the basis of race or ancestry violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 1947 the California legislature 
repealed the 1921 provision. Shopping, dining, and recreational activities at some business establishments were 
denied to Japanese-Americans in previous years. Restrictive covenants in housing affected where they lived. When 
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Supreme Court Cases
The internment of Japanese-Americans gave rise to the most important and controversial 
cases decided by the Supreme Court during World War II.
As the war progressed, various restrictions were relaxed.  Some Nisei had volunteered for 
military service and fought in Europe; other internees received permission to relocate to the 
eastern and Midwestern United States.  All remaining internees were released by the beginning 
of 1945, three years after their evacuation, when the Supreme Court held that the continued 
detention of loyal citizens against their will exceeded the scope of Executive Order 9066 and its 
implementing statutes.113
These regulations resulted in four cases reaching the Supreme Court: United States v. 
Hirabayashi,114 and Korematsu v. United States,115 and Yasui v. United States116 and Ex Parte 
Endo.117  All involved children of Issei parents. The Court upheld the convictions in 
Hirabayashi, Korematsu and Yasui without addressing the bases for the claims of military 
necessity.118
United States v. Hirabayashi challenged both the curfew and the subsequent relocation.  
Gordon Hirabayashi was born in Seattle, and attended the University of Washington.  In May 
1942, Hirabayashi disobeyed the curfew established by the President’s Executive Order, and two 
deceased members of the highly decorated 442nd Combat team were returned to the United States after World War 
II, some cemeteries refused to allow them grave-sites solely because of their ancestry.
113
  Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300-02 (1944).
114
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days later failed to register for evacuation.  He was indicted and convicted in a federal court in 
Seattle on two misdemeanor counts, and was sentenced to imprisonment for three months on 
each count.119
Hirabayashi asserted that the Executive Order was unconstitutional.  The case was heard 
by the Supreme Court in late spring of 1943, while world war was still being waged.  The Court 
declined to address the constitutionality of the relocation, but (by an 8-0 vove) it upheld the 
curfew.  In so doing it gave the government great deference in exercising its war-making 
authority: 
We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, 
that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an 
invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a 
different ancestry.  Nor can we deny that Congress, and the 
military authorities acting with its authorization, have 
constitutional power to appraise the danger in light of facts of 
public notoriety. In this case it is enough that circumstances within 
the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for 
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the 
decision which they made.  Whether we would have made it is 
irrelevant.120
Minoru Yasui was born in the United States and became a lawyer and a member of the 
Oregon bar.  Yasui violated the curfew order applicable to Portland, where he resided.  He was 
convicted in the federal court in Portland and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year.   As 
in Hirabayashi, the Court narrowed the scope of review to the issue of the curfew – which it 
unanimously upheld.121
119
 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83-84.
120 Id. at 101-02.
121 Id. at 115.
37
A year after Hirabayashi, the Court heard both Korematsu and Endo, each of which 
attacked the legality of the relocation.  
Fred Korematsu, also born in the United States, was convicted of remaining in San 
Leandro, California, and thereby violating a military-exclusion order.  A federal court in San 
Francisco overruled his claim that the orders in question were unconstitutional, suspended his 
sentence, and placed him on probation for five years.122
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, in the process reaffirming the constitutionality 
of the government’s forced relocation of Japanese-Americans.   Relying heavily on 
Hirabaysahi’s deference to the military in a time of war, the Court gave short shrift to the 
arguments that many of those targeted were full-fledged U.S. citizens who posed no 
demonstrable threat to national security, had not committed any crimes, and quite likely had been 
singled out solely because of their race:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference 
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses 
the issue.  Korematsu was not excluded from the [the West Coast] 
because of hostility to him or his race.  He was excluded because 
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly 
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West 
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, 
because they decided that the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from 
the West Coast temporarily. We cannot by availing ourselves of 
the calm perspective of hindsight now say that at that time these 
actions were unjustified.123
Ex Parte Endo was decided when hostilities were coming to an end, and America’s 
military superiority was manifest.  The issue in this case was not a direct challenge to the 
122
 Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
123 Id.
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regulations, but a writ of habeas corpus claiming that Mitsuye Endo, having proven her loyalty, 
could no longer be constitutionally detained at the Topaz Relocation Center in Utah.124
The Court agreed, finding that neither Executive Order 9066 nor its implementing 
statutes in any way authorized the incarceration of loyal citizens.  “In interpreting a war-time 
measure we must assume that their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible 
accommodation between liberties and the exigencies of war, that the lawmakers intended to 
place no greater restraint on the citizens than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the 
language they used.”125
Applying this approach, the Court found that Executive Order 9066 and Congress’ 
confirmation of it said nothing about detention after evacuation.  Thus Endo’s continued 
detention at an internment center was improper.126
Though the Supreme Court must have fully understood that after the Battle of Midway in 
1942 there was little danger of a Japanese attack on mainland United States, it nevertheless 
upheld the constitutionality of the internment in November of 1944.  How else to fathom the 
Court’s rationale, except to point to the fact that the war was still on?
Not all of the wartime cases brought before the Supreme Court, however, were decided in 
the government’s favor.  In 1944, a civilian ship-fitter in the Honolulu Navy Yard named Lloyd 
Duncan was arrested after a brawl with two armed marine sentries, and charged with violation of 
a general order prohibiting assault on military or naval personnel.  He was tried over his 
objection by a military court, found guilty, and sentenced to six months in prison.  In Duncan v. 
124 Id. at 223-24.
125
 Id. at 300.
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Kahanamoku, decided after the end of World War II, the  Court focused upon interpreting the 
Hawaii Organic Act statute rather than directly addressing the limitations imposed by the terms 
of the Constitution.127
The Court in Duncan reaffirmed the general proposition that the judiciary has an 
obligation to protect citizens’ constitutional rights even during times of war.128  Congress, said 
Justice Black, intended to permit martial law only in times of military necessary.  The Organic 
Act of Hawaii, in authorizing martial law, did not intend the military organization to supersede 
the civilian system any more than necessary.  The Court went on to evaluate the dangers 
apprehended by the military at the time White and Duncan committed their respective offenses.  
It concluded the military dangers were not sufficiently imminent to require civilians to evacuate 
the area or any buildings necessary to carry on the business of the courts.  Finally, the Court saw 
no military necessity to try a common brawler and a “normal” embezzler before military 
tribunals, these offenses bearing no relationship to the military.129
Duncan thus contrasts sharply with Hirabayashi and Korematsu, in which the Justices 
upheld the extraordinary discretionary authority exercised by the government in the internment 
of Japanese-Americans.130
127 Duncan v. Kayanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 316-17.  Justice Murphy filed a concurring opinion, which tracked much more closely the Milligan doctrine
with its prohibition against trial of civilians by military courts where the civil courts were able to function. Id. at 
325-35. Chief Justice Stone also concurred, noting that the full record in this case showed the conditions prevailing 
in Hawaii throughout 1942 and 1943, that from February 1942 on the civil courts were capable of functioning, and 
that trials of petitioners in the civil courts no more endangered the public safety than the gathering of the populace in 
saloons and places of amusement, which was authorized by military order.  Id. at 337.  Two members of the Court, 
Justices Frankfurter and Burton, dissented, accusing the majority of using the hindsight of 1946 to view the situation 
in Hawaii at the times Duncan and White were actually tried.  Id. at 337-58.  See also Rehnquist    ,  at 217.
130 See generally Harry N. Scheiber and Jane L. Scheiber, supra note ___,  19 U. HAW. L. REV. 477, 481 (1997).
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The Press in World War II
Restrictions on the press also became more severe during World War II. 
Immediately following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Congress created the Office 
of Censorship, which in turn instituted a Code of Wartime Practice.131  To gain access to the 
front lines, a reporter had to be accredited, one of the requirements for which was that he agree to 
submit all his work to military officials for censorship.132
In 1942 William Dudley Pelley, Lawrence A. Brown, and the Fellowship Press, Inc, were 
convicted of sedition for making anti-government and pro-Nazi statements in their newspaper 
Silver Shirt.  Pelley was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, Brown to five, and the Fellowship 
Press was fined $5000.133
Not all of those tried during wartime were convicted.  In 1944, Joseph E. McWilliams 
and thirty other defendants were indicted for conspiracy to interfere with, impair, and influence 
the loyalty, morale, and discipline of the United States armed forces by printing and distributing 
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publications advising, counseling, and urging insubordination and refusal of duty by members of 
the military and naval forces of the United States.  The indictment addressed the origin of the 
issue that began with a movement in Germany in 1933 to substitute the existing form of 
government in the United States with a National Socialist form by causing insubordination, 
disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty by members of the military and naval forces of the United 
States.134
The defendants were charged with conspiring in the District of Columbia with one 
another, with officials of the German Reich, and with the leaders and members of the Nazi Party. 
Furthermore, as part of the conspiracy the defendants and co-conspirators printed and circulated 
forty-two specified publications, used thirty-five specified agencies as distributors, and otherwise 
disseminated twenty-four specified representations and charges.135
The case went before a jury in April of 1944, and ended in a mistrial some eight months 
later as a result of the judge’s sudden death.  Thereafter on several occasions various of the 
defendants moved for trial, but without result. It was finally dismissed, the court finding that the 
defendants had not been accorded their Constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that the statute 
of limitations had passed.136
Nor did censorship always end in conviction.  In 1944, for example, James Omura, the 
editor of Rocky Shimpo, a Japanese newspaper in Denver, published editorials critical of the 
federal government’s decision in January of that year to open the military draft to the Nisei
internees.  Omura was arrested and tried for conspiring to counsel others to evade the draft, 
134
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although his sole contribution to the conspiracy were the opinions he voiced in his column.137  A 
federal jury acquitted him, although his career as a journalist was adversely affected.138
In 1944 Elmer Hartzel was convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act for anonymously 
mailing to military leaders his writings “depict[ing] the war as a gross betrayal of America, 
denounc(ing) our English allies and the Jews and assail[ing] in reckless terms the integrity and 
patriotism of the President of the United States.  Even though the Court said that it was aware “of 
the fact that the United States is now engaged in a total war for national survival and that total 
war of the modern variety cannot be won by a doubtful, disunited nation in which any 
appreciable sector is disloyal,” it nonetheless reversed Hartzel’s conviction for insufficient 
evidence.139
McCarthyism and the Korean War
Following World War II, it was not long before the “Red Scare” overtook much of the 
popular press – fueled in large measure by Senator Joseph McCarthy.  His anti-Communist 
witch-hunts, coupled with the machinations of the House Un-American Activities Committee, 
served to roil up both citizens and politicians.140 Only later would “McCarthyism” – which has 
since been defined as the persecution of innocent people by sensational but unproven accusations 
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– become recognized as one of the worst abuses of constitutional civil liberties in American 
history.141
Congress had passed the Smith Act in 1940, which made it a crime to advocate violence 
against the government.  The Act was little used until the McCarthy era, when the fear of 
communism led to the prosecution of Communist and Socialist party officials.  In Dennis v. 
United States,142 leaders of the Communist Party were indicted under §3 of the Smith Act for 
“willfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party a group of persons 
to teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by 
force and violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity 
of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence.”143
The Supreme Court deferred to executive and legislative power in upholding the 
convictions of individuals who merely studied communism.  The purpose of the Act, said the 
Court, was “to protect existing Government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and 
constitutional means, but from change by violence, revolution and terrorism.”144  The Court 
further justified use of the Smith Act:
141
  The definition appeared in a NEW YORK TIMES editorial on May 7, 2003, shortly after Congress released some of 
theretofore-secret archives of the Senate’s permanent subcommittee on investigations.
Those who recognized the excesses of McCarthyism early on were relatively few.  One was Learned Hand, 
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It is within the power of the Congress to protect the Government of the United 
States from armed rebellion and is a proposition which requires little 
discussion. . . . No one could conceive that it is not within the power of 
Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the Government by force and 
violence.145
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Black argued that the Smith Act was 
unconstitutional. “Violence is rarely, if ever, stopped by denying civil liberties to those 
advocating resort to force,” he wrote.146 “Once we start down that road we enter territory 
dangerous to the liberties of every citizen.”147
The provision authorizing the deportation of immigrants for membership in the 
Communist Party was not removed until 1991,148 although its substance resurfaced in 
1996 as part of the Congressional Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.149
Today the prevalent view is that the Supreme Court failed effectively to confront 
the excesses of the McCarthy era.  Dennis has been called “disastrous” and 
“shameful.”150  Justice Frankfurter’s opinion was labeled by one of his own biographers 
as a “judicial abdication of responsibility.”151 In fact, all of the Justices in Dennis have 
been similarly criticized.152
145
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Yet the notion that the Dennis decision was simply ill-considered is likewise 
misplaced, because it ignores the idea that most cases reflect the tenor of the times.  
When Dennis was decided in 1951, McCarthyism was at its peak. Within the preceding 
two years, mainland China had become a Communist state, the Soviet Union had 
detonated its first atomic bomb, and North Korea had invaded South Korea.  Alger Hiss, 
a former State Department official, had been convicted of perjury. Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg had been executed for passing nuclear secrets to the Soviets.  The Red Scare 
was in full bloom.153
Elected in 1946, McCarthy believed that by the 1950’s the highest levels of 
American government, including the State Department, had been infiltrated by 
communists, who were causing various failures in American foreign policy.  He made 
this claim most famously in a 1950 Lincoln Day speech in Wheeling, West Virginia – in 
which he professed to know, without any apparent evidence, the names of 205 
Communists working in the State Department.154
Internal investigations were nevertheless conducted by various liberal 
organizations – such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the NAACP, and the 
American Jewish Committee – which subsequently expelled members alleged to be 
communists.155  In 1954 Hubert Humphrey – the liberal co-founder of Americans for 
Democratic Action – proposed legislation to outlaw the Communist Party.156  Against 
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this backdrop, it is unrealistic to expect that a majority of the Supreme Court could have 
denied the constitutionality of loyalty oaths, anti-communist investigations, or criminal 
prosecutions for subversion.157
Although the American Civil Liberties Union and some journalists – notably 
Edward R. Murrow – fought strongly against McCarthyism, the general paranoia about 
the evils of communism diluted their opposition.  Many lawyers hesitated to defend 
liberal-minded clients.158  But even the ACLU was divided over whether to regard 
Communist Party affiliation as protected by the First Amendment.159  Until the early 
1960's, in fact, the ACLU itself included a strong anti-communist disclaimer in every 
brief it filed.160
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A Senate investigation later dismissed McCarthy’s claims about Communists in 
the State Department as fraudulent.161
In May of 2003, Congress released some of the theretofore-secret archives of the 
Senate’s permanent subcommittee on investigations. McCarthy, it turns out, preferred to 
screen witnesses prior to their appearance in open session so that he could weed out those 
who were more combative and articulate.  He chose only those who gave the impression 
of being weak or confused, or who would cast doubt on their veracity by invoking their 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Nevertheless, despite repeated threats 
that witnesses who refused to cooperate would be jailed for perjury, none of them ever 
were. But dozens of them, including 42 Army engineers, lost their jobs after testifying.162
Vietnam
The Supreme Court’s disposition on civil liberties during the Vietnam era was 
varied.  On the one hand, the Court upheld the conviction of David Paul O’Brien for 
burning his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse, in the process 
rejecting his claim that he was merely engaging in political expression protected by the 
First Amendment.  The Court refused to accept O’Brien’s contention that the motivation 
behind the statute forbidding destruction of draft cards was to suppress anti-draft and 
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anti-war speech, instead ruling that the law served the government’s legitimate interest in 
maintaining an effective selective-service system.163
On the other hand, in New York Times Co. v United States (the “Pentagon Papers” 
case),164 the Court rejected the government’s efforts to halt publication in the Times and 
the Washington Post of a stolen, top-secret military report detailing the history of 
American military involvement in Vietnam.  Here, the government contended publication 
of the document would compromise ongoing military operations and peace negotiations, 
and was likely to endanger the lives of American soldiers in battle or captivity.  But the 
majority of the Court concluded that the First Amendment rights of the newspapers and 
their readers were superior to the military concerns.165
In Cohen v. California166 and Gillette v. United States,167 both decided during the 
Vietnam War, the Court refused to enforce laws which prohibited speech condemning the 
draft and the rights of religious objectors. Indeed, it was at the height of Vietnam and of 
the Cold War when the Court finally overruled Whitney v. California,168 rejecting the old 
criminal-syndicalism laws and permitting the government to punish those who advocated 
illegal action only if their speech is intended (and is likely) to produce “imminent lawless 
action.”169
Thus, the Court found that general opposition to the war or defense effort, no 
matter how strongly expressed, is constitutionally protected.   Just because such 
163
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expression might be seen or heard by members of the active armed forces, or might have 
some detrimental effect on recruitment or the draft, is not sufficient to deny First 
Amendment protection.
This point was underscored in the 1966 case of Bond v. Floyd.170 Julian Bond had 
been elected to the Georgia House of Representatives, but the state legislature refused to 
give him a seat because of his statements opposing the draft and criticizing American 
policies in Vietnam.  At that time Bond was communications director of the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee, which had issued a strong statement opposing the war:
We believe the United States government has been deceptive in its 
claims of concern for freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the 
government has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of 
colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the 
Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia, and in the United States itself.
We maintain that our country’s cry of “preserve freedom in the 
world” is a hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation 
movements which are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the 
expediencies of United States cold war policies.  We are in sympathy with, 
and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a 
military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United 
States aggression in Viet Nam in the name of the “freedom” we find so 
false in this country.
We therefore encourage those Americans who prefer to use their 
energy in building democratic forms within this country.  We believe that 
work in the civil rights movement and with other human relations 
organizations is a valid alternative to the draft.  We urge all Americans to 
seek this alternative, knowing full well it may cost their lives as painfully 
as in Vietnam.171
The Court unanimously held that the refusal to seat Bond violated his First 
Amendment rights:  “Certainly there can be no question but that the First Amendment 
170
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protects expressions in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam and to the 
Selective Service system.”172
This position stood in stark contrast to the Court’s early First-Amendment 
jurisprudence, especially as expressed in the World War I-era cases of Schenk and Debs.  
While much of that evolution took place in circumstances not involving wartime dissent, 
Bond confirmed the current more expansive reading of free-speech guarantees against 
national-security claims. Although the Court simply declared that the statement in Bond
was protected (without reference to clear-and-present-danger or balancing criteria), it did 
articulate the idea that free and open debate of wartime policies and regulations is 
essential to the life of a democracy.173
Thus, by the mid-1960's a general right to express strong dissent to war and 
defense policies had come to be broadly tolerated.  Even if the government chooses to 
disregard or reject the opposition, it recognizes the inevitability of such protest in a 
society that aspires to remain democratic.  By now the issue was no longer the right of 
open dissent, but the extent to which the First Amendment protects expression 
specifically urging resistance to the Selective-Service laws, and the proper Constitutional 
line to be drawn between “expression” and “action” in various forms of protest.174
The draft-card burning cases of the 1960’s focused directly on the difficulty of 
separating governmental control of expression from governmental control of action. 
Although the Selective Service Act did not then specifically prohibit the intentional 
destruction of draft cards, it did require all those registered to have their cards in their 
172
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possession at all times.175  Violation of this regulation was punishable by a fine of 
$10,000 and/or imprisonment for five years.176  In 1965, Congress passed an amendment 
to the Selective Service Act which provided that anyone who “knowingly destroys [or] 
mutilates” a draft card is subject to penalties under the Act.177
Following passage of this amendment, the number of draft-card burnings 
increased and several prosecutions ensued. All of the courts involved, however, 
concluded that draft-card burning is expressive conduct that comes within the purview of 
the First Amendment. All of them relied upon the balancing test – with one court 
balancing in favor of First Amendment rights178 and three others against.179
Meanwhile, expression urging or advising resistance to the draft was on the 
increase.  In September of 1967, for example, a group of 320 ministers, professors, and 
writers signed a document entitled “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,”180 in which 
they recounted various methods of resistance to the war being used by different persons, 
including the refusal to be inducted. “We believe that each of these forms of resistance 
against illegitimate authority is courageous and justified.”181  The U.S. Conference on 
Church and Society, including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders, issued their own 
175
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public statement: “We hereby publicly counsel all who in conscience cannot today serve 
in the armed forces to refuse such service by non-violent means.”182
Although anti-war protests were widespread, they were generally tolerated as 
constitutional free speech.  Nevertheless, dissent was stifled by way of various forms of 
harassment from the executive and legislative branches of government.   For example, 
while President Johnson acknowledged the right of citizens to protest, he also let it be 
known that he “was dismayed by the demonstrations” and he gave his “full endorsement 
to the Justice Department’s Investigation of possible Communist infiltration of the anti-
draft movement”;183 and he said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation “was keeping an 
eye on anti-war activity.”184  Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach told a news 
conference that “the Justice Department [has] started a national investigation of groups 
behind the anti-draft movement,” adding that “[t]here are some Communists involved in 
it; we may very well have some prosecutions.”185  Six months later the national secretary 
of the Students for a Democratic Society said that there “seems to be a national 
investigation” of his organization by the F.B.I.186  There was also evidence that 
opposition to the Vietnam war was being taken as unfavorable evidence in loyalty-
security investigations.187
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Similar assaults upon wartime dissent came from Congress.  Many legislators 
denounced opposition to the war as disloyal conduct.188  In 1965, the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee made public a staff report which attacked a number of individuals 
as having “persistent records of Communist sympathies and/or of association with known 
Communists and known Communist movement and front organizations,” and asserted 
that the antiwar demonstrations had “clearly passed into the hands of Communists and 
extremist elements.”189   The named individuals were not given the opportunity to reply.  
In March of 1967, the House Committee on Un-American Activities issued a 
report on a protest scheduled for April known as Vietnam Week, the theme of which was 
stated as follows: “The real objective of Vietnam Week is not the expression of honest 
dissent to promote the best interest of the American people and their Government, but to 
do injury and damage to the United States and to give aid and comfort to its enemies.”190
Other forms of harassment included harsh physical interference by police officers 
against anti-war demonstrators, as well as intimidation (e.g., photographing of persons 
participating in peaceful antiwar marches and vigils).  There were also attempts by draft 
boards to accelerate the induction of antiwar demonstrators have also occurred.191
Summarizing the situation in June 1967, the American Civil Liberties Union said: 
[T]o applaud the fact that dissent has not been muted, despite the rising 
emotionalism of the Vietnam War, is not to say we may relax the civil 
libertarians’ vigil.  There are signs, ominous signs, that a storm is brewing.  
188 N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1967, at 1, col. 6.  Hearings on H.R. 271 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House 
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The random collection of incidents attached to this statement illustrate[s] 
the steadily accelerating strains on unpopular expression.  Such instances 
show that dissent is now the object of official and private intimidation and 
harassment.  Unless these, and others, are vigorously and courageously 
opposed, unless the right and importance of dissent are re-affirmed and 
defended, the nation could slip back into a new era of McCarthyism with 
its dangers to a free society – fear, conformity, and sterility.192
In January of 1968, the Constitutional issues involved in this form of expression 
were raised by the indictment of five members of the group which had issued “A Call to 
Resist Illegitimate Authority.193  The defendants – Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., 
Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, Marcus Raskin, and Dr. Benjamin Spock – were 
charged with conspiracy to “counsel, aid and abet diverse Selective Service registrants 
[to] refuse and evade service [and to] fail and refuse to have in their personal possession 
registration certificates and notices of classification [draft cards],” as required by the 
Selective Service regulations; and with conspiracy to “hinder and interfere” with the 
administration of the Selective Service Act, all in violation of section 462(a).194
*
  Ironically, contrasted with past censorship, the Vietnam War provided the press 
with an unprecedented opportunity for freedom.  Throughout the conflict, accredited 
journalists had almost unfettered access to the wartime theatre – even permitted to ride 
along with military transports. They faced virtually no censorship.  In return, the military 
simply asked that the press refrain from reporting items such as planned offensive and 
192 American Civil Liberties Union, The Vietnam War and the Status of Dissent, June 4, 1967.
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troop movements.   In fact only a handful of violations of the limited guidelines 
occurred.195
Nevertheless, the Vietnam War resulted in a significant deterioration in press-
military relations, in large part because reporters began to mount their own opposition to 
the war.  Increasingly, the media were filled with negative stories concerning the United 
States’ war effort, such as the widespread use of napalm and Agent Orange.196  The 
media’s distrust and cynicism was  likewise inflamed after the Joint U.S. Public Affairs 
Office started regularly to manufacture victories and exaggerate enemy casualties.197
After the war, large numbers of servicemen were left with a sense that the press 
was biased, sympathetic to the enemy, and ultimately responsible for the loss of public 
support for the war. Young soldiers from Vietnam would eventually take commanding 
positions in the military, and in later conflicts their memories and impressions of an 
unpatriotic press would serve to shape the military’s restrictions on the media.198
Grenada
In 1979, a bloodless coup led by Maurice Bishop took place on the Caribbean 
island of Grenada, and the new ruling junta began to develop increasingly strong military 
and economic ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union.  Four years later, in 1983, Bishop 
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was deposed and executed; martial law was imposed, and Grenadan troops were ordered 
to shoot any curfew violators.199
In October of 1983, faced with a growing threat to Americans and American 
interests in Grenada, the United States and six neighboring nations sent troops into the 
island.  The only resistance they faced came from about 1000 Cuban construction 
workers/militiamen, who held out for two days.200
   The invasion occurred in almost total secrecy, because – for the first time in 
American history – reporters were completely excluded from observing any part of the 
military operation.201  The government enforced the news blackout by refusing to 
transport the press to Grenada, turning away chartered press boats, and removing any 
reporters who had already reached the island.202  During this period, the only news about 
Grenada to reach the American public came from the Pentagon and the White House.203
The press were not granted access to the island until the civilian airport reopened –
eleven days after the fighting ceased.204
Officials in the Reagan administration and in the military offered several reasons 
for the news embargo.  Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger claimed that the 
199
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invasion force was not large enough to insure the safety of the press – and that he simply 
complied with the wishes of the military commander who did not want press coverage of 
the operation.  General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
defended the press exclusion on the ground that the success of the mission depended on 
the element of surprise.  Retired Vice Admiral William Mack speculated that the military 
force was already at sea when the government decided to invade: “You couldn’t put the 
press aboard without a difficult flight to the ships.”205
But this explanation rings hollow.  Although n the past the government and the 
press, working together, have insured operational security and secrecy without resorting 
to a total news ban,206 members of the press do not seek a guarantee of safety when they 
cover wartime news.   The obstacles to providing for press coverage of the Grenada 
operation were no more severe than those encountered during previous military 
operations.207
The media reacted angrily to the exclusion policy in Grenada.  Editorials in daily 
newspapers condemned the news blackout,208 and commentators contrasted the Grenada 
experience with the freedom of access to war stories that reporters have had in earlier 
conflicts.209  Ten news organizations released a statement calling for the government to 
“reaffirm the historic principle that American journalists” should be present at U.S. 
205 See Editorial, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1983 at A26; and Why the Surprise Move in Grenada – and What 
Next?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 7, 1983, at 33.
206
 Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1984, º6 Magazine, at 69, 92.
207
 Engber at 878.
208 See, for example, Editorial, WASH. POST, at A22, col. 1; Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1983, at A26, 
col. 1.
209
 Weintraub, U.S. Press Curbs: the Unanswered Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1983, at 1, 7, col. 5-6.
59
59
military operations,” and to guarantee that future “military plans should include planning 
for press access.”210
Meanwhile (in November 1983), General Vessey established the Media-Military 
Relations Panel to develop proposals for future press coverage of military conflicts.211
This commission, named the “Sidle Panel” after its chairman (retired Major General 
Winant K. Sidle), was comprised of representatives from journalism schools, the military, 
and the press.212  The Sidle Panel sent questionnaires focusing on press access and 
censorship to major news organizations,213 and  held hearings at which the news media 
asserted that the press has a right, grounded in both the First Amendment and historical 
practice, to cover wartime news.  Some organizations opposed censorship in any form.
Most press representatives acknowledged the need for military accreditation of 
reporters.214
Although the government claimed to recognize the public’s right to information 
about military operations, it emphasized the need to strike a balance between the public’s 
right to information and the military’s security concerns.  Particular concern was 
expressed about television news coverage and the attendant risk of compromising 
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operational security.  “On-scene review before transmission” was suggested, together 
with accreditation of reporters by the Pentagon in order to discourage sensational or 
inaccurate coverage.215
The Sidle Panel concluded that “it is essential that the U.S. news media cover 
U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security 
and the safety of U.S. forces.”216  The panel recommended development of a press-pool 
system for combat zones in remote or otherwise inaccessible areas, under which selected 
members of the press would be formed into small groups (“pools”) and allowed to access 
restricted areas on the condition that they share their information with excluded 
colleagues.  However, the panel emphasized that the pools would only be used in the 
initial stages of combat, not as the principal means of coverage.217
The panel also recommended that the military develop “security guidelines” 
governing press coverage of operations (violation of which would result in a reporter 
being excluded from the operation) and that the Pentagon expand programs designed to 
improve media-military communications and understanding.218
In October 1984, the Defense Department announced that it had created a press 
pool that could be assembled on short notice to cover military operations.  Although the 
goal was provide for full coverage within twenty-four to thirty-six hours, the decision to 
extend the use of press pools beyond that period would rest with the operation 
commander.  In a departure from past practice, the military, rather than the news media, 
215
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would select the news organizations that would participate in the pool.219  The Pentagon, 
however, reserved the right to decide against bringing the press on a particular military 
action.220
Although some members of the press criticized the vagueness of the report and 
the institution of a pool system, initial media response to the Sidle panel’s report was 
favorable.  The press agreed to the pool arrangement primarily to get access to the front 
line.  They formed a group to stand by in readiness for any military operation.221
The Persian Gulf War  
Although the press-pool idea had been used in Panama in 1989 – where news of 
the operation immediately leaked and the military criticized the media’s inability to keep 
the mission a secret222 – the Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict to test the pool 
system.223
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, which immediately requested assistance 
from the United Nations.  In mid-January of 1991, a coalition of U.N. forces (led by the 
United States) attacked both Iraqi forces in Kuwait and military targets in Iraq.  Over the 
next seven weeks, Americans witnessed instantaneous media coverage of the conflict –
including that from a CBS news team which drove to the front line and was captured by 
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Iraqi soldiers, and from a CNN correspondent who broadcast live from behind enemy 
lines.224
In general the public believed it was being told the truth about Operation Desert 
Storm, and did not consider the reports of stunning, virtually casualty-free victories for 
the coalition,  as anything but factual.  By contrast (Americans were told) the Iraqi people 
were deliberately misled by a government-controlled media, which were publishing false 
accounts of great losses by the coalition forces.225
Hindsight affords the opportunity to examine more accurately the U.S. military 
censorship that did take place. Saudi Arabia, it turned out, was described as one of the 
most hostile nations in the world to the notion of press freedom.226   The Pentagon 
interceded on behalf of the American press corps to demand and secure visas and 
transportation into the war zone.227  In exchange, the press agreed to certain rules of 
conduct and guidelines:228 the media were told what information could not be reported 
because it might jeopardize operations and endanger lives, their reports were subjected  to 
security review prior to release, and access to the front line was restricted to one member 
of the media pool.229
224
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The number of reporters allowed into the pool was tightly limited.230  Even pool 
reporters were highly restricted in the scope of their coverage.  Virtually ignored was one 
of the Sidle Panel’s principal recommendations – that pool coverage be limited to those 
situations where it is the only feasible way of getting reporters to the scene.
The Pentagon chose not to publicly release any negative footage, only videos 
illustrating the unfailing accuracy of the bombs.   Throughout Desert Storm, briefing 
officers were able to craft the impression of a high-tech war operation, cultivating the 
perception that its firepower seldom missed the target – in general, telling the public only 
what they wanted it to know.231  In contrast to the sensational photographs and video 
offered up at press conferences, after the conflict ended the Pentagon disclosed that the 
much-ballyhooed “smart bombs” made up only seven percent of the U.S. explosives 
dropped on Iraq and Kuwait.  While the smart bombs were ninety-percent accurate, the 
81,980 tons of conventional bombs were merely twenty-five-percent accurate.232
Similarly, it came to light that restrictions had been placed on images of 
recognizable casualties, scenes of fighting, or anything resembling a religious 
observance.233  Only thirty-eight of the 1,104 Operation Desert Storm photographs in 
eligible for pool selection, a reporter had to maintain: (a) a continuous presence of at least three weeks in 
Saudi Arabia; and (b) a long-term presence covering Department of Defense operations.  Id.  By the end of 
the war, nearly 20 18-member pools had been established.
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America’s three major news-magazines showed actual combat activity.  Overall, there 
was virtually no coverage of the ground war until it was over.234
Meanwhile, journalists who tried to function outside of the pool system were 
often detained or denied access completely.  “[W]e didn’t have the freedom of movement 
to make an independent assessment of what the military is all about,” said one reporter.  
“Everything was spoon fed.”235  Another said that he “had more guns pointed at me by 
Americans or Saudis who were into controlling the press than in all my years of actual 
combat.”236  The pool system was called “a disaster,” “dysfunctional,” and “a smoothly 
functioning dictatorship.”237  According to various media spokes-people, the restrictions 
made it impossible for reporters and photographers to tell the public the full story of the 
war in a timely fashion. Yet, the military continued to use pool coverage and enforce its 
restrictions for nearly every facet of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.238
The disagreement between the press and the military during Operation Desert 
Storm mirrored the arguments of the past.  The media complained that the command was 
stingy with information, that whatever was disclosed was varnished to such a high public-
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relations gloss that the accuracy was suspect, and that government censorship was 
preoccupied with style and packaging as opposed to substance.239
Numerous courts and commentators have recognized that, even if the press has no 
constitutional right of access to the front line in a foreign war zone, an informed citizenry 
is essential to a democracy.  As the Supreme Court has put it, “[P]aramount among the 
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from 
deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and 
foreign shot and shell.”240  In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of 
the public at large.”241
This function is even more important when there is a foreign conflict.  Then, it 
becomes essential that the government be “vigorously and constantly cross-examined, so 
that the fundamental issues of the struggle may be clearly defined, and the war may not 
be diverted to improper ends, or conducted with an undue sacrifice, of life and liberty, or 
prolonged after its just purposes are accomplished.”242  Press access, in the broadest 
terms, permits the public to serve as a check on executive power, foreign policy, and the 
military.243
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On the other side, the command accused the media of being petulant, 
meddlesome, and recklessly unsympathetic to the realities of military operations.244
It can be seen that the competing considerations bearing on the press’ right of 
access in times of war – we do not want to compromise our military efforts, yet we want 
to be kept honestly informed – were on classic display.  American strategy called for a 
large-scale ground attack from an unpredictable direction – a plan later credited with 
having enabled the coalition to retake Kuwait without suffering heavy casualties.245
Obviously, if the press had reported this maneuver in advance, the critical element of 
surprise could have been severely compromised.246
Dissatisfied members of the media challenged the government’s system of 
restraints in court. In Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense247 the 
complaint was dismissed as moot and too abstract.  Past injury alone, according to the 
court, “is not sufficient to merit the award of relief against future conduct.”248
The quick and apparently successful conclusion of the Persian Gulf War served to 
preserve the Supreme Court’s policy of delicate avoidance. In the future, it is likely the 
Court will still have to address once again the difficult issue of military censorship.  If it 
is to remain consistent with the standing principals on prior constraint, the Court will 
have to place a heavy burden of persuasion on the military.  On the other hand, the desire 
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not to interfere with successful war-waging might compel the Court to relax the burden –
thereby weakening the policy against government censorship that lies at the core of the 
First-Amendment protection for the press.249
Prior restraints deal with speech, and the right of access deals more with conduct.  
There are strong arguments that the media’s claim of a right of access involves more 
“conduct” than “speech,” and is therefore outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.250  The Supreme Court has often relied on this distinction, in several cases 
holding that the press’ news-gathering activities are subject to regulation because they do 
not directly involve speech.251
This debate will likely resurface each time America becomes involved in war.252
The Rehnquist Thesis
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist weighed in with his own analysis of the 
status of American civil liberties during wartime in his 1998 book, All the Laws but One.  
However, its underlying premise – that there are times when civil liberties must be 
subordinated to national security – is flawed.
Rehnquist contrasts Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War 
with restrictions authorized by Congress during World War I, when the executive branch 
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under Woodrow Wilson was granted powers to punish and silence subversive speakers.  
Although the latter period saw no trials of civilians before military courts (and an 
increased involvement of the civil courts in the adjudication of individual-rights claims),
Rehnquist concludes that the Wilson administration had the same instinctive desire to 
suppress harsh criticism of the war effort as had Lincoln’s administration during the Civil 
War.253
According to Rehnquist, the Court’s reluctance to countermand the government 
during wartime is inevitable, even desirable.  In an interview following publication of his 
book, he speculated on what he might have decided to do under similar circumstances:
I think one of the most difficult things in the world to do, is 
to second-guess people who were in leadership positions at 
that time.  . . . . [I]t’s very easy, in the atmosphere of the 
late 1990s, to say something was a very bad thing to have 
done.  But so far as criticizing people who were in 
leadership positions at that time, you’ve got to realize they 
operated under the ethos and the standards of the times in 
which they lived.254
The Chief Justice points out that these military officials were not entrusted with 
the protection of anyone’s civil liberties, but to make sure that vital areas were as secure 
as possible from espionage or sabotage.  The traditional unwillingness of courts to decide 
constitutional questions unnecessarily serves to illustrate the Latin maxim, Inter arma 
silent leges: “In time of war the laws are silent.”255
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Nor is Rehnquist especially concerned about the evacuation and internment of the 
Issei, who “were both by tradition and by law in a quite different category” from their 
citizen children, the Nisei.  “Distinctions that might not be permissible between classes of 
citizens must be viewed otherwise when drawn between classes of aliens.”  Due to 
genuine fears of Japanese attack and invasion of the West Coast, and because the Issei
were so concentrated in that area, the Chief Justice argues that the government was 
justified in relocating them.256
If the courts are prone to judicial reluctance during wartime, would it not be better 
to withhold a decision until after the war when they would be more inclined to follow 
judicial norms?  We must recognize, says Rehnquist, the human factor that inevitably 
enters into even the most careful judicial decision.257   But Rehnquist makes no apologies 
for treating civil liberties differently during time of war: 
In any civilized society the most important task is 
achieving a proper balance between freedom and order.  In 
wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance 
shifts to some degree in favor of order – in favor of the 
government’s ability to deal with conditions that threaten 
the national well-being. . . . And if we feel free to criticize 
court decisions that curtail civil liberty, we must also feel 
free to look critically at decisions favorable to civil 
liberty.258
For example, Rehnquist compares the internment of Japanese-Americans with the 
less restrictive treatment of German-Americans and Italian-Americans.  The Issei, he 
says, were tightly concentrated along the West Coast, where Japanese military activity 
fortunes of war were vastly improved. 
256
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was feared – whereas  Germans and Italians were more dispersed along the East Coast, 
where the perceived danger was the sinking of ships rather than bombings or troop 
invasions.  This, though it was on the East Coast where two groups of Nazi soldiers did in 
fact infiltrate the mainland United States with the goal of attempting sabotage, and did so 
with the assistance of American citizens of German descent.259
In other words, according to Rehnquist, the government decided to 
evacuate/intern all Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast for essentially military 
reasons.260
Rehnquist cites various judicial declarations to make clear that the government’s 
authority to infringe upon civil liberties is greatest in time of declared war.261  “When a 
nation is at war many things which might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to 
its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight,” wrote Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes) in Schenck.262  “Otherwise impermissible ethnic or racial 
distinctions may be permissible during wartime,” said Chief Justice Harlan Stone in 
Hirabayashi.263 “A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon 
becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few,” observed 
Judge Learned Hand.264
Besides his assertion that the balance between an individual’s interest in freedom 
and the government’s interest in order must shift during wartime in favor of the 
government; Rehnquist concludes that there is no reason to think future wartime 
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260 REHNQUIST at 136-37 and 187-188.
261 REHNQUIST at 218.
262 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
263
 320 U.S. at 100.
264 LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (Knopf 1953).
71
71
presidents will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt.  Also, future Justices 
will decide questions no differently from their predecessors – avoiding or narrowing their 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights until after the crisis is over.  And this, according to 
Rehnquist, is an altogether desirable result.265
*
The primary problem with Rehnquist’s thesis is that it is based upon a highly 
filtered reading of history, one that fails to recognize or assess the extent of the harms 
done that later proved needless.
For example, in discussing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil 
War, he appears unfazed by the fact that suspects could not seek review in civil courts 
and were subject to trial by military tribunals for offenses unknown to civil law – that, in
one observer’s words, Lincoln had created an “extra-judicial system of freewheeling 
military justice”266
Rehnquist also leaves out events that run counter to his thesis – such as when 
Lincoln exempted the Jews of Tennessee from General Grant’s over-reaching expulsion 
order.  He  disapproves of the Court’s decision in Milligan (in which the majority of the 
Justices rejected the government’s defense of Lincoln’s wartime regime of military 
justice for civilians), saying the court went out of its way to “to declare that Congress had 
no authority to do that which it never tried to do.”267
Rehnquist similarly slants Twentieth-Century wartime deprivations of civil 
liberties.  Describing the internship of Japanese-Americans, he glosses over deprivations 
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266
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endured by the internees.  He ignores Justice Jackson’s ringing dissent in Korematsu.268
Nor does he adequately address the question of why the East-Coast Italians and Germans 
were not treated in a similar way to the Japanese – even though some of the latter were 
caught trying to commit sabotage.  Nor does he address the fact that that there were no 
instances of Japanese subversion on the U.S. mainland.269
Rehnquist also fails to make any mention of other deprivations of civil liberties, 
such as the editorial censorship of James Omura’s newspaper, the grand-jury
investigation of the America First Committee, the harassment of Dellinger’s People’s 
Peace Now organization, the conviction of William Dudley Pelley and the Fellowship 
Press, the indictment of Joseph McWilliams, and the conviction of Elmer Hartzel.270
Similarly, the late Chief Justice ignores or minimizes the Twentieth-Century 
wartime victories won by libertarians.  For example, Congress refused to ratify Woodrow 
Wilson’s proposal to subject a person to up to ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine 
for publishing anything deemed by the President to be useful to the enemy.  Wilson 
himself opposed a bill suggested by an assistant attorney general that would authorize 
military trials and the death penalty for civilians who interfered with the war effort.271
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Rehnquist likewise chooses to disregard federal judge Louis Kaufman’s opinion 
in U.S. v. Kuwabara, chastising the government:  “It is shocking to the conscience that an 
American citizen [can] be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under
duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not 
yielding to such compulsion.”272
All the Laws but One says barely anything about the Korean or Vietnam Wars.  
Rehnquist gives short shrift to the Pentagon Papers case, in which the Supreme Court 
found that the government had not met its burden of proof that there was enough of a 
threat to national security to justify prohibiting the Washington Post and New York Times
from publishing wartime documents.273
Not surprisingly, Rehnquist avoids mentioning instances where wartime 
Presidents and courts have exercised restraint before limiting liberties, and to decline 
discussing non-war situations that likewise threatened the national security.274
How would Rehnquist explain the Court’s pro-speech decisions during the 
Vietnam era, when the government was unable to control the widespread anti-war 
sentiment that took place around the country?  At that time there was substantial domestic 
turmoil.  The anti-war and anti-draft movements were as vocal as any such movement 
during World War I.275
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In short, All the Laws but One might be a good brief supporting his proposition 
that in wartime security needs trump individual rights, but it is a bad history.  The 
political and judicial record on civil liberties in wartime is a good deal more complex 
than the simple black-letter case the Chief Justice presents.276
276
 Muller, supra note 9at 1416-17.
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II. THE “WAR” AGAINST TERRORISM
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government 
instituted a number of measures designed to enhance national security – including a 
broad range of espionage activity,277 beefed-up immigration policies and controls,278 the 
establishment of an Office of Homeland Security,279 unlimited pre-trial detentions,280 and 
secret military tribunals.281  Many of the new practices and procedures were embodied in 
the USA Patriot Act of 2002.282
The new regulations and legislation gave rise to serious questions about their 
underlying wisdom and reasonableness: the extent to which we should be willing to 
sacrifice individual liberties for national security, the justification for increased 
governmental spying on law-abiding citizens, and regulatory actions that are unrelated to 
terrorism and do nothing to stop it.283
Civil libertarians – both liberals and conservatives (many of whom are 
uncomfortable with any governmental intrusion into personal freedoms) – feel that 
questioning the actions of an overreaching government is the essence of patriotism. Thus, 
wiretapping should be overseen by meaningful judicial review, law-enforcement agents 
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should notify occupants that homes will be or have been searched, and no one (neither 
citizens nor non-citizens, unless the danger they pose to the state can be clearly 
demonstrated) should be subjected to indefinite detention.284
In an era when the potential for terrorist acts of mass destruction far more than 
theoretical, where should the line be drawn between protection of individual rights and 
national security?
Legislative Precursors to 9/11
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Before passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978, the CIA and 
FBI had illegally shared information with one another, creating a great expansion in the 
scope of domestic surveillance which resulted in investigations of political candidates, 
anti-war protesters, and civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr.285  Responding to 
these perceived abuses of domestic surveillance, particularly during the administrations 
of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, Congress sought (1) to regulate domestic 
electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence information, and (2) to protect national 
security by providing tools by which foreign intelligence crimes could be detected and 
prevented.286
Under FISA, the federal government was allowed to conduct electronic 
surveillance of “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers” for foreign intelligence 
information, with judicial approval.  To get approval for such surveillance under FISA, a 
284
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high-ranking government official was required to certify to the court that the purpose of 
the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.  Courts in turn devised a 
“primary purpose” test, which required that the Department of Justice set up a procedure 
limiting contact between foreign intelligence agents in the FBI and federal prosecutors.287
Application of the primary-purpose test, along with the policy of the Department 
of Justice, resulted in “a wall” that some believe prevented the discovery of intelligence 
that may have prevented the 9/11 attack.  Following the events of 9/11, Congress 
responded to this concern by amending the original FISA in the Patriot Act, requiring the 
government to show that a “significant purpose” (as distinguished from the more 
difficult-to-prove primary purpose) of the surveillance is foreign intelligence gathering –
ostensibly allowing for greater  surveillance of American citizens.288
Legislative Responses to 9/11
Prior to 2001 there was some doubt as to whether international terrorism was on 
the increase or decrease.  In fact the number of terrorist incidents and deaths during the 
1990’s declined significantly in comparison with those recorded in the 1980’s.289
All of that changed on September 11, 2001, with the demonically coordinated
suicide attacks via hijacked domestic airliners.290  The simultaneous assaults, carried out 
in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia by nineteen avowed terrorists, killed close to 
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3,000 people and have caused billions of dollars in property damage and insurance 
costs.291
Recent Federal Actions Limiting Civil Liberties
The Use-of-Force Resolutions
Both the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization characterized 
9/11 as an “armed attack” on the United States.  This terminology was purposeful, 
signaling that the U.S. regarded the event as equivalent to an act of war under 
international law, as it was labeled by the President.292  Accordingly, for the first time in 
its history, NATO invoked its collective self-defense clause.293
It followed naturally that on September 12, 2001 the U.S. would turn to the U.N. 
Security Council in hopes of obtaining a strong “use-of-force” resolution.294  What it 
received instead, however, was a statement of support 295 – which specifically recognized 
America’s 
“inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in 
accordance with the Charter” and called on “all States to 
work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks.”  The 
resolution further addressed the issue of responsibility: 
“[T]hose responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be 
held accountable.”296
291
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Although Congress elected not to exercise its power to declare war,297 it almost 
unanimously passed its own use-of- force resolution, which left no doubt as to its resolve 
to authorize the President to use military force if necessary.  Among other things, the 
Joint Resolution recognized the authority of the President under the Constitution “to take 
action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United 
States…[and]  to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons.”298
Thus armed with resolutions from Congress, NATO, and the United Nations, the 
President quickly ordered the intelligence community to gather evidence to identify and 
locate those who committed the terrorist attacks, and to determine if any international 
state entity may have provided support.  A substantial body of evidence pointed directly 
to the already-notorious al Qaeda – an umbrella organization founded in 1989 by a Saudi 
national named Osama bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam, a member of the Palestinian 
Moslem Brotherhood299 – and to the ruling Taliban government in Afghanistan.300
From the early 1990s until the end of 2001, al Qaeda, whose expressed agenda is 
to “attack the enemies of Islam all over the world,”301 operated openly in Afghanistan 
297
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with the full support of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.302  Indeed Afghanistan became a 
training ground for thousands of Arab and non-Arab al Qaeda militants, including 
Kashmiris, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and others who were encouraged to infiltrate 
numerous other countries for the purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks.303  At the same 
time, radical Islamic fundamentalists began to make increasingly bold and public 
statements to support their terrorist actions.  
The United States gave the Taliban regime an ultimatum: to turn over the al 
Qaeda leaders and shut down all terrorist camps in Afghanistan, or be attacked.304  When 
the Taliban leadership refused to comply, the U.S. (and its principal ally Great Britain) 
used overwhelming military force, which in several months appeared to rout both al 
Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. Since then, al Qaeda has been forced to 
revert to clandestine terrorist operations.305
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush famously characterized
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “an axis of evil” because of their continuing support and 
sponsorship of terrorist groups.306  (The official annual State Department list of nations 
considered sponsors of terrorism currently also includes Libya, Syria, Sudan, and 
Cuba.307)  The President declared that the “United States of America will not permit the 
302See Christopher Dickey, Training for Terror, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 50 and Ali A. Jalali, 
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world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive 
weapons.”308
Much of the debate that followed centered around the question of international 
law, which justifies the use of armed force only as a means of self-defense:  Could the 
U.S. go beyond its “War on Terrorism” rhetoric and take military action against those 
nations it identifies as rogue supporters of terrorist activities, but which have not actually 
physically engaged in an act of aggression against the United States?  Would such a quest 
be able to sustain the economic costs it would engender, not to mention the perhaps even 
greater danger to international peace and security?309
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has amply confirmed the constitutional 
principle that, during wartime, the law of survival is paramount – trumping other 
fundamental rights to speech, liberty, and property.  On the other hand, the Court has 
drawn distinctions even where military action is involved.  The question of when the 
rules of war take effect is complicated, involving more than a simple congressional 
declaration.  In the current conflict, the Court may be required to distinguish still further 
between conducting the domestic “war on terrorism” and law- enforcement actions 
against other crimes that also pose a national security threat, such as international drug 
cartels and organized crime.310
Can the Supreme Court be convinced a war is being fought if (as in the war 
against terror has no foreseeable end? 
308 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note ____ at 2226. 
309
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Indeed the Court has determined that even serious criminal or economic crises do 
not necessarily “increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed 
upon power granted or reserved.”311  The “war on drugs,” for example, also has its 
paramilitary and international aspects – involving unprecedented resources for 
interdiction, heavy criminal penalties for sales, and aggressive profiling and prosecuting 
of drug suspects.  But while the fight against drug trafficking has been called a “war,” the 
Court has determined that it is essentially a law-enforcement program and has thus 
prohibited using intrusive technology to detect drug use through people’s walls, or using 
race or nationality as factors in profiling drug “mules.”  It has also required the same 
standards of proof for probable cause in drug violations as for any other criminal 
activity.312
The “war on terrorism,” however, while still ostensibly in its infancy, is a new 
hybrid of military action and law enforcement.  While the enemy may have the same goal 
as that of a warring nation – to destabilize the U.S. government and economy and 
undermine its citizens’ security for political ends – modern terrorists are not a traditional 
enemy with fixed territory and a standing army, but a transnational group of criminals 
living both here and abroad who attack private citizens wherever they may be.313
How the Court understands the post-September 11th status of the nation is likely 
to affect not only its wartime jurisprudence but also its approach to domestic criminal law 
more generally.  Justice O’Connor has already suggested as much.  “[I]t is possible, if not 
likely, that we will reply more on international rules of war than on our cherished 
311 Id. at 24.
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constitutional standards for criminal prosecutions in responding to threats to our national 
security.”314
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 
By the end of 2001 America’s complacency in its enjoyment and expectation of 
ever-expanding constitutional liberties had been brought to an abrupt end.  Almost 
immediately after the President’s post-9/11 declaration of a war on terrorism, law-
enforcement agencies began rounding up suspects; close to a thousand of them were 
arrested or detained without any formal charges having been filed.315
The new millennium’s first major test of the extent to which the Constitution must 
bridge the gap between freedom and security came with the passage of the USA Patriot 
Act of 2001.316
The investigative and enforcement provisions of the Patriot Act were sweeping.  
Particularly affected were protections against the invasion of privacy.  The government 
was now permitted to conduct secret searches of homes and offices, and (if it persuades a 
judge that the subject might flee or destroy evidence) to copy records without their
owner’s assent.  Judicial authority was been expanded to issue a single warrant under 
which a “roving” wiretap can be installed on all telephones a suspect uses anywhere 
309Some international lawyers continue to claim that a war cannot be fought against a non-state 
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within the United States. Law-enforcement agencies were now allowed to monitor e-mail 
and Internet use.317
The Act also required the attorney general to detain non-citizens who he 
determines pose a threat to national security until they can be deported, and if their home 
country refused to take them back, to detain them until he decides they no longer pose a 
threat to national security.  All detention and deportation cases involving non-citizens and 
certified by the attorney general as national security risks must be heard in federal court 
in Washington, D.C. and nowhere else.  U.S. intelligence agencies and the military can 
share otherwise secret grand jury information in terrorism and national security cases.  
And the statute of limitation for terrorism crimes (formerly five years) was lifted 
completely.318
The USA Patriot Act provided its own definitions for “terrorist organization,” 
“domestic terrorism,” and “international terrorism.”  A terrorist organization is any group 
designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization, or a group of two or more 
individuals that commits, plans, or prepares to commit terrorist activities. Domestic 
terrorism is defined as the unlawful use of (or threat to use) violence by a group or 
individuals committed against American people or property, or to intimidate or coerce a 
government civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
International terrorism involves acts dangerous to human life that violate the criminal 
laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal act if committed 
therein. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national 
317 Id. at § 206.
318 Id. at § 204, § 201, § 412, § 203, § 809.
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boundaries in terms of how terrorist accomplish them, the persons they appear intended 
to coerce or intimidate, or the place in which the perpetrators operate.319
Given the tenor of the times, there was little surprise that Congress, in October 
2001,  quickly passed the USA Patriot Act by an overwhelming margin.320  To appease 
whatever legislative opposition was voiced about the Act’s expansive grant of power to 
law-enforcement agencies, the Senate agreed to a four-year sunset limitation on its 
wiretapping and surveillance provisions.
Not surprisingly, libertarians almost immediately perceived the new law as an 
unnecessary threat to fundamental freedoms in the name of national security.  
For example, in a mailing to its membership in November 2002, the American 
Civil Liberties Union spelled out the reasons for its strong objections – specifically, that 
the Act:
(1) allowed for indefinite detention of non-citizens on minor visa violations; 
minimizes judicial supervision of federal surveillance (despite fact that judges 
deny wiretaps very rarely); 
(2) expanded the government’s ability to conduct secret searches; allows delayed 
notification in many cases; 
(3) permitted sharing of sensitive information in criminal cases with intelligence 
agencies without judicial review; 
319
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(4) gave the Attorney General and Secretary of State the power to designate 
domestic groups as terrorist organizations and deport any non-citizen who belongs 
to them; 
(5) granted FBI broad access to sensitive business records about individuals 
without having to show evidence of a crime, and to student records based on mere 
certification that records are relevant; provides overly broad definition of 
“terrorism” (e.g., under the new definitions, acts of simple civil disobedience 
could cause groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals to become 
targets of “terror” investigations); 
(6) allowed the Attorney General summary power to violate the attorney-client 
privilege by monitoring communications between those detained by Justice 
Department and their lawyers; 
(7) established military tribunals to try suspected terrorist that will not be required 
to follow same principles of law and evidence required in civilian courts; 
(8) silenced dissent by equating criticism with aid to terrorists, and declaring that 
public debate would “erode our national unity diminish . . .our resolve . . . give 
ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends”; and 
(9) allowed the FBI to spy on Americans in their churches, on the Internet, in 
bookstores, and in libraries – even if there is no evidence a crime might have been 
committed.  (Librarians can be charged with a crime if they so much as inform 
their patrons that the government has been investigating their reading habits.)321
321 American Civil Liberties Union, CIVIL LIBERTIES AFTER 9-11: THE ACLU DEFENDS FREEDOM, Sept. 
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Criticism of the USA Patriot Act as unnecessary and overbearing came from other 
quarters as well.322  Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe worried that “the twin 
[Constitutional] pillars” of checks-and-balances and open public accountability were both 
seriously eroded by the new regulations.323
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft staunchly defended the USA Patriot Act,
emphasizing the need for authorities to be equipped with new powers to detect and 
prosecute terrorists:
As terrorists have learned to adapt to the changing tactics of law 
enforcement, so, too, have we learned to adapt to the changing 
needs of America's domestic security. . . .And among the chief 
lessons we have learned in the past ten months is that our ability to 
protect the homeland today has been undermined by restrictions of 
the decades of the past.324
Ashcroft’s position found its own supporters – even among law professors. 
Douglas Kmiec, the dean at Catholic University, argued that the line is no longer clear
between what is criminal and what is terrorist or related to foreign intelligence.  
Detaining and trying unlawful combatants in military tribunals may be perfectly 
warranted; if anything, the Justice Department’s treatment of terrorist suspects has erred 
Debate, and Dissent; Other Cities Have Also Raised Concerns, Council Takes Stand Against Patriot Act, 
WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, 10/16/02.
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too greatly on the side of civil liberties;  regular criminal trials are subject to pretrial 
gymnastics that are wholly unsuited to a court’s criminal-justice function.325
Oren Gross, while recognizing that the real threat of terrorism will cause 
democracies “to embrace and employ authoritarian measures,” nevertheless suggested 
that extra-legal measures may be appropriate in “truly extraordinary occasions . . . at 
times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional dictates, when responding to 
emergency situations.326
William Barr, who served as Attorney General under the first President Bush, 
reflected widespread support for the legislation among conservatives:
The danger to our civil liberties comes from the terrorists, . . . not the 
government’s actions.  I think [those actions] have been restrained,  
moderate, well within the law and pose no genuine civil liberties concerns. . 
. . The Constitution doesn’t give civil liberties to our enemies.  The 
Constitution is concerned with us winning the war by either killing or 
incapacitating those who are trying to kill us.327
“Patriot II”
By early 2003 the Justice Department had drafted new legislation called the 
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, designed to expand even further the new 
government powers for domestic surveillance created by the 2001 USA Patriot Act.328
As drafted, the so-called “Patriot II” would have removed existing protections 
under the Freedom of Information Act, making it easier for the government to hide whom 
325 Attacks on Ashcroft Miss True Threat to Our Liberty, NEW JERSEY L. J., 9/12/02.  See also notes                  
infra and accompanying text regarding the use of military tribunals.
326 Error! Main Document Only.Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises 
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 at Error! Main Document Only.1030-31 (2003).
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it is holding and why, and preventing the public from ever being able to assess whether 
the government has overreached. Another section would have nullified existing consent 
decrees against state law-enforcement agencies which prevent them from spying on 
individuals and organizations.329
Perhaps the most troubling provision in the proposed new law would have 
stripped U.S. citizenship from anyone who gave “material support” to any group that the 
attorney general designates as a terrorist organization.330 Under the Constitution, 
Americans cannot be involuntarily deprived of citizenship. The new measure would have 
allowed the government to overcome that guarantee by arguing that anyone who provides 
“material support” to an organization on the attorney general’s blacklist – even if that 
support were otherwise lawful – intends to relinquish citizenship and therefore may be 
immediately expatriated.331
The proposed new legislation was widely criticized by both liberals and 
conservatives.332 The American Civil Liberties Union declared that the government “has 
resorted to detentions, deportations and other tactics reminiscent of the Palmer Raids that 
led to our founding 83 years ago.” The ACLU claims that the Justice Department is 
aggressively wielding its new power to force banks, Internet service providers, telephone 
companies, and credit agencies to turn over their customers’ records – without having to 
329 See Jack M. Balkin, USA Patriot Act: A Dreadful Act II, LOS ANGELES TIMES, February 13, 2003 at p. 
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330
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disclose the investigation to the customers, and without having to prove to a judge that 
there is probable cause a crime has been committed.333
III. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Determining the proper extent to which civil liberties can be curtailed during 
times of terror, before history plays itself out, is a daunting but necessary task. Hindsight, 
of course, is almost always superior to foresight.  Nevertheless, although the best 
speculation may be little more than educated guesswork, history should be instructive.
Fear of the unknown will always be a factor in fighting an intractable enemy –
particularly one which treats suicide as martyrdom – but in the perilous quest to preserve 
civil liberties in uncivil times, we must be ever vigilant not to tread on hard-won 
individual rights without a reasonable degree of certainty that preventive and 
investigative measures are temporary and necessary.
The Patriot Act and its Progeny
Sixteen of the provisions of the Patriot Act of 2001 were originally set to expire at 
the end of 2005,334 virtually assuring that renewal of the Act would be hotly debated in 
Congress.  Indeed the sunset provisions brought directly into play the concerns of a wide 
variety of groups and individuals.335 Nearly 400 communities and the legislatures of 
seven states expressed similar misgivings.336
333 ACLU Online, April 4, 2003 (ACLUOnline@aclu.org).
334
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Some of these concerns were addressed in the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, 
which passed Congress in early March of 2006. The most important amendments were 
produced by a bipartisan cross-section of Congress:337
* The renewed Act now guarantees that those receiving a subpoena gag order 
(also known as a National Security Letter) can challenge that order in court 
through judicial review.338
* The former requirement that an individual served with a secret subpoena 
must reveal to the FBI the name of his attorney has been removed. 339
* Libraries operating in their traditional role are not subject to secret 
subpoenas.340
The changes, however, do not require that there be any individualized suspicion 
of wrongdoing by Americans before their financial, medical, library, and bookstore
records can be searched.”341
In particular, the government’s demand for records still contains an automatic and 
potentially permanent gag order, which is virtually impossible to challenge in view of 
the bill’s requirement that a court accept the government’s “national security” 
certification supporting a gag order as “conclusive.”  From the perspective of civil 
libertarians, this provision actually makes the former Patriot Act more restrictive.  While 
a gag order is no longer indefinite, it will last for an initial one-year period that can be 
http://www.aclu.org/images/general/asset_upload_file958_24316.pdf.
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renewed indefinitely at the government’s discretion.  Worse still, unlike the old law, 
which did not make government certifications conclusive, the new law binds courts to 
accept such certifications.  Federal courts had, in fact, rejected certifications where they 
failed to provide sufficient facts to meet the compelling interest standard demanded by 
the First Amendment for a prior restraint on speech.342
In addition, secret searches of homes and offices will remain available in any 
federal case under a vague standard, and notice can be delayed for months. There is still 
no requirement that roving wiretaps name a target or a facility being monitored, and  
government agents need not verify that a suspect is actually using the facility before 
eavesdropping on private conversations.343
The reauthorized Patriot Act expands the Secret Service’s power to impose 
“exclusion zones” to apply to non-Presidential events, and it increases fines and criminal
penalties that the Treasury Department has used in the past to coerce non-profit
organizations and businesses into checking employees against flawed government lists.344
Privacy Issues
It is of no small concern that Fourth-Amendment rights continue to be jeopardized 
by the USA Patriot Act.   For example, government agents are empowered to enter a 
home or office when the occupant is away, take photographs and remove property, and 
have no obligation to inform the occupant until afterwards.   There have been challenges 
to the so-called “sneak-and-peek” warrants which permit delayed notice of a search, 
342 See ACLU Letter, supra note           .
343 Id.
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where (the government argues) the warrant may have an “adverse result” on an 
investigation.345
In November of 2002, the Bush administration won approval for wider use of 
surveillance against terror and espionage suspects when a federal appeals court declared 
that such surveillance does not violate the Constitution.  The ruling by a three-judge 
panel, sitting as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review appointed by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the standard of evidence required to open a wiretap for 
national security purposes is generally much lower than that needed for domestic criminal 
cases.346
The court emphasized, however, that it was not ready “to jettison Fourth 
Amendment requirements in the interest of national security,” but that it also recognized 
the validity and importance of FISA.347
For over two decades, the FISA court had seldom turned down a government 
request for a wiretap.  Nevertheless, the court said that the Attorney General had gone too 
far in his zeal for wiretaps, citing some 75 cases in which the Justice Department tried to 
circumvent rules designed to protect Americans from surveillance.348
The President through his Attorney General continues to argue that 
circumventing FISA is necessary to monitor al Qaeda operatives in the United States.  He 
345 See ACLU, HOW THE USA PATRIOT ACT EXPANDS LAW  ENFORCEMENT "SNEAK AND PEEK" 
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did not explain, however, how such a policy can be justified under the separation-of-
powers principles embodied in the Constitution.349
Civil libertarians fear that the government has already been using the new anti-
terror measures to conduct espionage wiretaps in ordinary criminal investigations.  The 
Fourth Amendment still exists, and citizens continue to be entitled to protection against 
unreasonable searches.  When police watch a suspect with high-powered, inter-connected 
and intelligent cameras that are linked to criminal-history databases, they are in effect 
conducting unwarranted and possible unconstitutional searches.  This practice is 
especially nefarious when put to political uses, as they have been in Washington, D.C.350
Moreover, there is no certain proof that surveillance cameras are effective. In fact 
crime actually increased in Great Britain despite the installation of up to two million 
cameras in streets, shops, banks, and other public areas.351
The courts have ruled that warrantless monitoring of attorney-client conversations 
with prisoners who had been placed under special administrative measures does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because there can be no expectation of privacy in 
prison.352  However, the question of whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the 
right to counsel presumes confidentiality has yet to be fully addressed.
Supporters of the Patriot Act argue that some of the 9/11 hijackers used library 
Internet terminals to communicate.  The “apocalyptic visions of the demise of American 
civil liberties,” they say, “are widely overblown.”  Nevertheless, many communities 
349
 Bruce Fein, Scant…or onerous surveillance?, WASH. TIMES, February 7, 2006.  
350 Christian Parenti, DC’s Virtual Panopticon: A Camera System in the Nation’s Capital Is Making Civil 
Libertarians Nervous, THE NATION (June 3, 2002) at 24. See also Editorial, Domestic Spying: A Secret 
Court Relaxes the Rules for Conducting Anti-Terror Surveillance in This Country, NEWSDAY, November 
20, 2002 at p. A30.
351 US Watchdog Slams Police Over Use of Aerial Cameras, MORNING STAR, June 15, 2002 at 3.
352 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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around the country have passed local measures opposing the Patriot Act.353 The power 
granted by the Patriot Act to the FBI to pursue library records and computer hard drives
(in order to determine what books patrons have checked out, the web pages they have 
visited, and where they have sent e-mails) is ripe for abuse.354
Immigration Policies and Pre-Trial Detentions
Following the events of September 11, 2001, concerns for national security 
measures understandably provoked a re-examination of immigration laws, focusing not 
only on who should be allowed into the country but under what conditions they are 
allowed to remain.  
For some time, there have been widespread misgivings about the effectiveness of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in carrying out its functions under 
existing laws.  According to the latest INS statistics, over 30 million visas were granted 
to foreign nationals in 1998, mostly to enter the United States for purposes of study, 
teaching, travel, or business.  By some analyses, as many as forty percent of those 
granted visas have overstayed them, and as many as ninety percent of non-detained 
individuals who received final deportation orders failed to surrender to the INS.  For 
these failures, the agency has been widely and roundly criticized.355
353 Librarians Bristle at Patriot Act, CBS Evening News, April 26, 2003 [available at CBSNEWS.com].  
See also ABA 2003 Great Debate, Security and Privacy in the U.S., National Press Club, April 24, 2003.
354
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355
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Although responsibility for the bombing in 1995 bombing of the federal building 
in Oklahoma City that left 168 people dead was eventually traced to an American 
dissident, at first it was feared that the incident had been perpetrated by a Middle Eastern 
terrorist group.356   In response Congress passed the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) – designed to protect the country from foreign terrorism.
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Immigration and Nationality Act was 
modified by the USA Patriot Act, which allowed the Attorney General to take into 
custody any alien certified to be inadmissible or deportable on one of six grounds: (1) 
espionage; (2) sabotage; (3) export restrictions; (4) attempt to overthrow the United 
States Government; (5) terrorist activities; and (6) any other “activity that endangers the 
national security of the United States.” The government is then required to begin either 
criminal or deportation proceedings within seven days of the detention.  However, certain 
certified alien terrorists who are not likely to be deported in the foreseeable future due to 
the continuing nature of the investigation, are subject to indefinite detainment.357
A 2001 Supreme Court decision, Zadvydas v. Davis, arguably exempted 
suspected alien terrorists as a “small segment of particularly dangerous individuals” that 
the government could subject to indefinite detention.358  The new law seems to satisfy the 
Court’s jurisprudential criteria, in that it specifically provides (a) for judicial review of 
suspected alien terrorists’ detentions via habeas corpus; (b) for fixed time limits for 
review of the Attorney General’s initial certification; and (c) that an alien whose 
356
 Ronald Weich, Upsetting Checks and Balances:  Congressional Hostility Towards the Courts in Times 
of Crisis, at http://www.aclu.org/congress/courtskipping.pdf (Oct. 2001).
357
  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2001);  see also section 412(a)(7).  The 
changes are codified as 8 U.S.C. §1226a.
358
  533 U.S. 678 (2001). See infra notes           and accompanying text.
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“removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained for additional 
periods of up to six months if release threatens national security or the safety of an 
individual or the community.”  Furthermore, the Attorney General is required to review  
certification every six months; the suspected alien terrorist can request a reconsideration 
of the certification every six months.359
The Patriot Act makes aliens subject to deportation for virtually any activity in 
association with a “terrorist organization.” Because the Act defines “terrorist activity” to 
include virtually any use or threat to use a weapon against a person or property, and 
defines a “terrorist organization” as any group of two or more persons that engages in 
such an act, virtually every dissident organization is encompassed – including a pro-life 
organization that once threatened workers at an abortion clinic, the African National 
Congress, the Irish Republican Army, and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Once a 
group has been designated as “terrorist,” aliens are deemed deportable for everything 
from recruitment to fund-raising to providing any kind of material support, including 
payment of dues. Conceivably, the law would extend to those who might support or join 
counter-terrorism groups.360
Congress may want to make further changes to tighten the existing law, including 
more thorough screening and background checks of individuals seeking visas to enter the 
United States and tracking the millions of illegal aliens who have overstayed their 
visas.361
359
  8 U.S.C. §1226b.
360
  David Cole, Terrorizing Immigrants in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 29 WTR HUM.RTS. (2002) 11-
12.
361
  Eric Schmitt, Agency Finds Itself Under Siege, With Many Responsibilities and Critics, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 15, 2002, A11. 
98
98
The degree to which such legislation encourages racial profiling or an atmosphere 
of bigotry and fear in the general population is difficult to predict.362  Laws that have a 
negative impact on the majority of law-abiding aliens – especially those made guilty 
merely by their association with an ethnic or racial class – are anathema to fundamental 
American principles of fairness and justice.  The Supreme Court has ruled that guilt by 
association violates the First and Fifth Amendments.363 Everyone, including aliens, has a 
First-Amendment right to associate with groups regardless of their goals, so long as they
are not illegal.  Likewise, under Fifth-Amendment jurisprudence, guilt is personal.364
The Patriot Act also allows the government to deny entry into the country purely 
on the basis of what an applicant may have said, particularly if the words could be 
construed as endorsing terrorist activity.  But in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1990, after years of politically-motivated denials of visas that proved embarrassing,
Congress explicitly repealed such grounds for exclusion.365
Prior to 9/11, aliens could be detained only so long as the government had reason 
to believe that they posed a threat to national security, but they could be released upon 
order of an immigration judge.  The new regulations gave the INS greater detention 
powers:  Now, even if a judge rules in favor of the alien, INS prosecutors can keep him 
362
 Laurie Goodstein, American Sikhs Contend They Have Become a Focus of Profiling at Airports, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at B6. 
363 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); 
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364 See Scales v. United States., 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
365 See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (V) (b). 
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locked up simply by filing an appeal of the release order, without any showing that the 
appeal – which routinely takes many months – is likely to succeed.366
Moreover, the Patriot Act gives the attorney general himself the power to detain 
aliens – defining a suspected terrorist so broadly that it includes even those who may 
have provided humanitarian aid to an organization disfavored by the government.  
Detentions may be based merely on “reasonable grounds to believe” that an alien has 
engaged in terrorist activity, a standard that the INS has likened to the “reasonable 
suspicion” required for a brief stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment.  Reasonable 
suspicion, however, does not always justify a custodial arrest, much less indefinite 
detention.  
The Act also permits detention for up to seven days without filing any charges.  
Yet the Supreme Court has ruled in a criminal setting that charges must be filed within 
forty-eight hours except in the most extraordinary circumstances.  Hundreds of 
immigrants not charged with any crime, much less involvement in the 9/11 attack, have 
been detained in secret, even where judges rule that there is no basis for detention, and 
without going before a judge at all.367
After 9/11, the INS increased the scrutiny of refugees to the United States and 
their relatives.  According to the new rules, before boarding a plane for the U.S., refugees 
must meet with a representative of the International Organization for Migration (funded 
by the State Department), who will compare them with photographs in their application 
366 See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J.
1003, 1030 (2002).
367 See infra notes 402 and 403 and accompanying text. See also Cole, supra note 372 at 13.
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documents.  Refugees are fingerprinted at major ports of entry in the United States before 
they are allowed to go to their final destinations.368
For immigrants already on U.S. soil, the federal government launched sweeps of 
workplace where significant numbers of undocumented immigrants were thought to be 
working.  Critics of such actions have argued that U.S. employers knowingly and actively 
recruited into their firms many of the undocumented immigrants, and suggest that the 
government should be targeting employers rather than the undocumented workers. 
Several industries – such as commercial aviation, meat-packing, agribusiness, 
construction, and hospitality services – could collapse if undocumented immigrants were 
summarily deported. Moreover, many immigrants who are the targets of these 
enforcement actions have children who are U.S. citizens.369
Both the AEDPA and the USA Patriot Act present new challenges with regard to 
protecting the civil liberties of Arabs and Arab-Americans – both of which groups have 
been denied the protection afforded to normal criminal defendants.370
In short, if maintaining traditional American civil liberties is itself central to 
preserving national security, our immigration policies need substantial shoring.
368
  Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, and the Movements of People, 36 INT’L LAW 91, 96 
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Deportations
Following the events of 9/11, the Attorney General, wielding power bestowed 
upon him by Congress, gave immigration judges the authority to close to the public 
certain “special interest” deportation hearings in the interest of national security.  About 
750 such cases were active at the time.  The Chief Immigration Judge issued a directive 
consistent with that of the Attorney General, requiring the judges in his jurisdiction 
presiding over special-interest deportation cases to close all proceedings to the public, 
press, family, and friends of the deportee.  Only the deportee’s attorney could view the 
record.371
In December of 2001, the government began removal proceedings against Rabih 
Haddad, suspected of funding terrorist organizations through an Islamic charity he 
operated in Detroit, as an alien subject to deportation for overstaying his tourist visa.  
Without prior notice to Haddad or his attorney, his bail hearing was closed to the public. 
Bail was denied and he was taken into custody, where he remains.372
Various suits were filed claiming that the directive violated the First-Amendment 
right of access to deportation hearings.373 At virtually the same time, media plaintiffs in 
Newark sought access to and information about deportation hearings held in the Newark 
371 See 67 Fed. Reg. 36799 (May 28, 2002); 8 C.F.R. §3,46(f)(3). “Special interest” cases are defined as 
those involving aliens identified by the Department of Justice to “have connections with, or possess 
information pertaining to terrorist activities against the United. States.” The Department of Justice also 
created an interim rule authorizing immigration judges to issue protective orders sealing documents, court 
records, and prohibiting deportees and their attorneys from disclosing specified information. In the war on 
terror, the government is rounding up foreigners, checking their immigration status, and then, sometimes, 
deporting them. It won't give out their names. This American Life: Secret Government, National Public 
Radio, Jan. 10, 2003. See also supra notes 402 and 403and accompanying text.
372 In December 2002, Haddad’s attorney filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
part of the Justice Department. Lebanese Man Appeals Deportation Order, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2002 at 
A9.
373 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17646.
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Immigration Court which, pursuant to the same directive, had been denied because they 
involved “special-interest” cases.374
Both the deportation hearings and media organizations in each case were in 
separate federal jurisdictions. The appellate court in each circuit reached diametrically 
opposite decisions.
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the district court had granted the media 
plaintiffs’ motion. In August of 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
finding that the directive violated the public’s right of access to deportation hearings 
conferred by the First Amendment, and that any closing of deportation hearings must be 
done on a case-by- case basis.375
In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the district court recognized a 
presumption of openness for deportation hearings, holding that the directive was not so 
narrowly tailored that it curtailed the public’s right of access in the least restrictive 
manner.  Consequently, said the court, the government failed to overcome the strict-
scrutiny standard, and operation of the directive was enjoined.  Less than two months 
after the Detroit Free Press decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 
thereby reinstating the directive that required the hearings be closed.376
The split in the circuits meant that the Supreme Court, which once ruled that all 
criminal trials must presumptively be open, would have to decide the issue.377 However, 
374 North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21032 (3d Cir., 10/8/02).
375
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in May of 2003, the Court declined to review the decisions, thus leaving intact, at least 
for the time being, the split in the circuits.378
Profiling
Even in the face of official condemnation, racial profiling of South Asians and 
people of Middle-Eastern extraction by police and public security personnel appears to be 
distinctly on the increase.
To many observers, it simply makes sense to focus law-enforcement energies on 
Arab and Middle Eastern men: like it or not, the argument goes, they are the people who 
constitute the real threat, and no amount of political correctness will change that. 
Terrorist attacks of such enormous proportions as those which occurred on 9/11, followed 
by a declaration of war, makes racial profiling a temporary necessity that no patriotic 
American should protest.  It has become necessary to get information from people likely 
to know the Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern suspects.  It is hard to avoid the 
assumption that this kind of information will not come from the population at large, but 
from the Middle Eastern communities themselves.379
On the other hand, profiling can amount to a coded racial appeal of the type that 
has had negative reverberations throughout U.S. history.  Although the assumption of 
guilt on the basis of racial identity is not new, it is contrary to American principles of 
fairness and justice, an inadequate means by which to preserve constitutional values in a 
378 Supreme Court Declines To Rule On Legality Of Closed Immigration Hearings, http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=HKR8ebImq1&Content=246 (last visited March 6, 2006).
379 See David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common Sense" in the Fight Against Terror? 17 
CRIM. JUST. 36 (Summer, 2002).
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period of distress.  The government’s implicit justification for racial profiling also serves 
to encourage hate crimes.380
Another argument against profiling is that it fails to fathom the nature of the 
enemy in the current war against terrorism.  Al Qaeda has shown itself to be intelligent, 
resourceful, patient, and adaptable.  Fighting terrorists effectively may well require 
ensuring good relations with the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States.381
As is often the case in times of national crisis, non-citizen immigrants were the 
hardest hit by the Bush Administration’s anti-terrorist regulations.  Following 9/11, the 
government secretly rounded up and detained somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 
people, mostly foreigners.  Not one of them was charged with involvement in the 9/11 
attacks; except for four people indicted in August  2002 for supporting terrorism, no one 
has been charged with a terrorist act. The vast majority were arrested on various 
immigration charges and then effectively disappeared.  Their cases were not listed on any 
public docket, their hearings were closed, and the presiding judges were instructed to 
neither confirm nor deny that the cases exist.382
The policies promulgated by the government would deprive all Americans of their
due-process rights, not just immigrants.  A case in point is that of Jose Padilla, a U.S. 
citizen arrested on American soil on suspicion of plotting to plant a bomb.  He has been 
380 See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement And Subordination: The Consequences of Racial 
Profiling After September 1, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2002 Symposium).
381 See Liam Braber,  Korematsu's Ghost: a Post-september 11th Analysis of Race And National Security,
47 VILL. L. REV. 451 (2002).
382 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002);  Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 
F.Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F.Supp.2d 288 (D.N.J. 
2002). See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms, THE NATION, 9/23/02.
More than a year later, the government acknowledged that most of those detained after the 9/11 
attacks were deported, released, or convicted of relatively minor crimes not directly related to terrorism.  
Several dozen were held as material witnesses. Associated Press, December 12, 2002 (CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 
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held indefinitely in a Navy prison, and denied access to counsel.383 According to the 
White House, Padilla will stay confined to a brig in South Carolina “until the end of the 
war.”384
The government alleges that Padilla was an “enemy combatant” who plotted to 
assemble a “dirty bomb” that would spread radioactive contamination over a wide area.  
It cited three cases in support of its argument that enemy combatants can be detained for 
purposes of intelligence-gathering and ensuring they are unable to further assist the 
enemy:  Ex Parte Quirin (where the Supreme Court held that eight Nazi soldiers, 
captured on U.S. soil in 1942,  none of them U.S. citizens, could be tried in military 
tribunals);  In Re Territo (in which the Court upheld denial of habeas corpus in 1946 to a 
U.S. citizen who had been raised in Italy, joined the Italian army, and captured in 1943, 
was held as prisoner of  war and transferred to camp in California); and Colepaugh v. 
Loone (in which the Court refused to overturn the death sentence of an American citizen 
who had become a Nazi spy, who had slipped ashore in Maine in 1944, and who had 
been tried in secret military tribunals and sentenced to hang).385
383
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In June of 2002 Padilla filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Southern District 
of New York, arguing his detention violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.386
In November of 2005, Padilla finally won the right for his case to be heard, when the 
government announced that he would be charged with “providing – and conspiring to 
provide – material support to terrorists, and conspiring to murder individuals who are 
overseas.”387
A case similar to Padilla’s is that of Yaser Hamdi, who was born in America to 
Saudi parents, and who was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan.  Like Padilla, 
Hamdi is being held in a Navy brig, uncharged and without access to counsel.  When a 
habeas corpus petition was filed on his behalf,  the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that his detention was legal and he was not authorized to challenge his 
designation as an enemy combatant.388 That decision has been roundly criticized.389
In reviewing that decision, the Supreme Court found that although Congress was 
authorized to detain “enemy combatants,” due process requires that such a person be 
given a meaningful opportunity to consent to the factual basis for the detention, before a 
neutral magistrate.390  Three years after his initial capture, it was announced that Hamdi 
386 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 432 (2004). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
the President lacked authority to detain Padilla, and the government subsequently petitioned for certiorari.  
In June of 2004, the Supreme Court dismissed the action without reaching that issue, finding that the 
District of South Carolina and not the District of New York was the proper place to file the habeas petition, 
thus the Supreme Court.
387 Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Press Conference Regarding the 
Indictment of Jose Padilla, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_051122.html (last accessed 
March 6, 2006).
388
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would be allowed to return to Saudi Arabia where he would have to renounce any claim 
of American citizenship, and to accept travel restrictions as it was determined he was not 
a major threat.391
Even liberals defend detentions in some cases. Professor Tribe, for example, feels 
it would be “suicidal” to release captured soldiers who belong to an enemy force 
committed to the murder of American civilians, whether it is the army of a nation-state or 
of a trans-national group like al Qaeda.   Military detention may indeed be constitutional 
“if review by a federal court confirms the executive’s assertions that people detained are 
in fact enemy combatants.”392
Similarly, some lawyers think that the Bush administration is well within its 
authority to order detention of unlawful combatants until the conclusion of the armed 
conflict, and then to try them before either a military tribunal or civilian court.393
But liberals and conservatives agree that the detention policy can go way beyond 
what is necessary in order to achieve national security.  Prof. Tribe also feels that the 
government has gone too far:
When it comes to the fundamental right to talk to a lawyer, to talk to a 
judge, not to have the government unilaterally by its own say-so draw the 
boundary between the preventive wartime model and the reactive judicial 
model, there’s really no difference between citizens and non-citizens.  
This is not like any other war.  It’s not like the Civil War, the 
Revolutionary War, World War I or II. This one by definition can go on 
forever like the war on cancer or the war on drugs. Because that’s right, 
391
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we have to be unusually careful about checks and balances and about 
openness and accountability.394
Indeed it appears that the government has made more than one mistake in its 
sweep of men of Middle-East descent following the 9/11 bombings.  For example, Hady 
Hassan Omar was arrested in September of 2001, taken from his wife and child, and held 
in solitary confinement in a maximum-security penitentiary in Louisiana under the new 
anti-terror measures.  He was not allowed to see an attorney. He was in captivity for 73 
days. After he was released, he filed suit in a federal court, arguing that the government 
exceeded its constitutional powers and deprived him of his civil rights.395
In all, close to 1,150 young Muslim men were rounded up in the aftermath of 
9/11.  More than 400 people have been deported following lengthy internment periods 
and closed hearings. Only three of those arrests resulted in terrorism-related 
indictments.396
Terrorism is not like traditional crime, which calls for apprehension of the 
perpetrator, trial, and conviction.  The nature of the terrorist threat requires that a strong 
effort be made to prevent it before it occurs, and that goal calls for a greater use of 
extraordinary investigative and prosecutorial techniques.  What it also calls for, however, 
is greater accountability.397
394 Liberty vs. Security, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, September 10, 2002.
395
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p. 50.  The case is still pending.
396 Id. See also Transcript, 60 Minutes, April 7, 2003.
397 See comments of  Loretta Taylor (a former federal prosecutor), Liberty vs. Security, The NewsHour with 
Jim Lehrer, September 10, 2002.
109
109
Secret Military Tribunals
A rhetorical theme of the Bush Administration that has resonated well with the 
public is that the United States will “bring justice to the terrorists and them to justice.”398
In the military campaign in Afghanistan, approximately five hundred al Qaeda
and Taliban fighters were captured and turned over to U.S. forces for disposition; about 
three hundred of them were transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for temporary 
internment.399  Among the detainees were citizens of some twenty-five countries, 
including Britain, Australia, France, Belgium, Sweden, Algeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.400
Two questions immediately arose concerning due process. First, were these 
individuals entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions?401
Second, if criminal trials were to be pursued by the United States, should the accused be 
tried in a federal district court or by a military tribunal? 
The Third Geneva Convention covers the treatment of prisoners of war and 
procedures for criminal proceedings against them, including the definition of who 
constitutes a bona fide POW.402  After some internal debate, the Bush Administration 
affirmed that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did apply to the conflict in Afghanistan 
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 Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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and, hence, to the Taliban government. However, since al Qaeda is a terrorist 
organization, under the law of war its members are not considered as part of an armed 
force.  They did not carry arms openly, bear a fixed distinctive sign visible at a distance, 
and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war – all 
requirements under international law.403
Moreover, they used civilians as both the means and targets of their attacks.  
Having engaged in acts of war both in the September 11th attacks and in fighting 
alongside the Taliban in an internationally-recognized armed conflict in Afghanistan,  
they can be deemed responsible for breach of the law of war, but are not entitled to the 
status of prisoners of war. The United States argued further that the Taliban fighters had 
likewise forfeited any special status because they had “adopted and provided support to 
the unlawful terrorist objectives of the al Qaeda.”404
Thus it was determined that neither the terrorists who planned and executed the 
9/11 attacks nor the Taliban who gave them harbor are entitled to receive POW benefits.  
403 See Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva 1949, Art. 12 states:  
“Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units 
who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the 
Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them. Prisoners of war may only be 
transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the 
Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to 
apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, 
responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they 
are in its custody. Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in 
any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being 
notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request 
the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.”
404
 Jess Bravin, Bush Says No Taliban, Al Qaeda Fighters are POWs Under Geneva Conventions, WALL S. 
J., Feb. 8, 2002, at A20.
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Nevertheless, the Bush Administration has declared that all detainees would be treated in 
accordance with humanitarian principles set out in the Geneva Conventions.405
POWS are liable to prosecution by the forces holding them for violations of the 
laws and customs of war or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  Even a citizen of 
a “party to a conflict” who is captured by his own sovereign government – such as John 
Philip Walker Lindh, an American-born Taliban fighter captured while engaged in 
combat against U.S. forces406 – can be prosecuted by his own government for treason, 
murder, and other crimes.  But a POW may only be tried according to the rules laid out in 
the Third Geneva Convention, which provide for basic due process: “A prisoner of war 
can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts 
according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the 
Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been 
observed.”407
The use of military commissions to try enemies of the United States for war 
crimes and related violations of international law, such as crimes against humanity, 
committed abroad (or in the case of the Civil War, was not fully under the control of the 
U.S. government), has a long history.  It is also legal under international law: all nations 
have jurisdiction to punish war criminals, and the Geneva Convention requires each 
signatory to search them out and bring them to justice in its own courts.  In theory at 
405
 Susan Sachs, Group Reports Mistreatment of Detainees, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2002, at A11.
406
 Dexter Filkins, With the Military Present, Red Cross Officials Talk to Captured U.S. Citizen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at B2.
407
 Third Geneva Convention, supra note ___, art. 102, 6 U.S.T. at 3394, 75 U.N.T.S. at 212.
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least, the United States shares with other countries jurisdiction over war criminals, and it 
could exercise that jurisdiction through civilian federal district courts.408
Congress, however, has authorized these courts to try war crimes only when either 
the perpetrator or the victim is a U.S. national.409    For some cases, military forums are 
the only workable option; in an international armed conflict, commanders in the field 
have the authority to convene them.410
The rules governing the operation of the tribunals that the Pentagon released in 
March of 2002 closely matched the recommendations of the American Bar Association a 
month earlier.411  The ABA had urged that military tribunals be used in limited 
circumstances and in accordance with fair trial standards.  It adopted a resolution that 
these special commissions not be used to try alleged violations of the laws of war by U.S. 
citizens, lawful resident aliens, or other aliens who were in the United States legally.  The 
ABA also called upon the Department of Defense to require that military tribunals 
observe the fair trial standards contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Finally, the resolutions urged the 
408
 Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals Who Commit 
International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1996).
409
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president and Congress to consider the impact of military tribunals on possible 
prosecutions of U.S. citizens in other nations.412
Are military tribunals necessary under existing law?
The U.S. government has effectively applied its experience combatting organized 
crime (using civilian courts) to fighting terrorism.413   In addition, federal district courts 
have the legal authority under both domestic and international law to prosecute 
nonresident aliens for terrorist crimes committed on foreign soil, as well as for war 
crimes.414
A widely cited precedent is United States v. Yunis,415  which involved the criminal 
trial of an Arab terrorist who participated in the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines 
airplane at Beirut International Airport in June 1985.  The only connection the hijacking 
had with the United States was the fact the plane carried some American citizens.  After 
reviewing the pertinent international agreements relating to hostage-taking and hijacking, 
the federal district court denied a defense motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and 
Yunis was convicted of conspiracy, hostage taking, and air piracy.416  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that jurisdiction is not precluded by norms of 
customary international law.417
412
 James Podgers, ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue, 1 No. 5 A.B.A. J. E-Report 1, Feb. 8, 2002;  Molly 
McDonough, An Uncertain Risk: Late Resolutions on Military Tribunals May Still Be in the Works, 1No. 3 
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In short, U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to try individuals for terrorist-related 
offenses under a variety of statutes, and in at least one case involving a foreign national 
who tried to commit an in-flight bombing of an American Airlines flight from Paris to 
Miami in December 2001 that power is being exercised.  Instead of charging suspected al 
Qaeda war criminals with violations of the law of war, the federal courts apply parallel 
statutes related to the malum en se crime, or apply the appropriate “terrorist statute.”418
Some observers have noted, however, that trials of suspected terrorists in an 
ordinary district court also carry moral and practical down-sides, not the least of which is 
that they tend to underscore the weakness of American policy over the past decade in 
dealing with terrorism against U.S. targets.419  Also, both the CIA and the FBI have 
concentrated on solving past cases, rather than taking action to prevent future terrorist 
attacks.420
*
The question of where best to try enemy combatants was brought to a head in 
November of 2001, when President Bush signed an executive order that authorized the 
creation of military tribunals for the purpose of prosecuting certain “non-citizens” who 
may have engaged in terrorist acts against the United States, or who aided/abetted 
terrorists.421  In so doing the President re-asserted that those detained at Guantanamo Bay 
418
 Jess Bravin & Greg Jaffe, American Prisoner in Cuba to Be Moved to U.S., WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2002, 
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Array of Unknowns Still Troubling, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2002, at A4.
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were unlawful belligerents not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, suspended the attorney-
client privilege, and ordered that over a thousand people be detained without publicly 
identifying them.422
Although the Constitution requires that Congress authorize and regulate military 
tribunals,423 the President assumed that power in an Executive Order dated November 13, 
2001. 424
A military tribunal consists of a panel of officers who are authorized to render a 
verdict and sentence.  Historically, the question has been whether tribunals are 
constitutionally capable of prosecuting non-citizen belligerents for offenses in violation 
of the law of war (and not whether they can be used to prosecute citizens).  As noted 
earlier, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion on the issue in the post-American Civil 
War case of Ex Parte Milligan425 – holding that as long as the civilian courts were 
operating, the use of military tribunals to try citizens who were not actual belligerents 
was unconstitutional.  The standard for the use of military tribunals to prosecute non-
citizen belligerents for offenses in violation of the law of war is set out in the World War 
II era case of Ex Parte Quirin.426
2002, at A6.
422 He also persuaded American news networks not to carry full broadcasts of Osama bin Laden because 
the broadcasts may carry hidden messages. Laurence H. Tribe and Neal K. Katyal, Waging War, Deciding 
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (Citing BRUCE ACKERMAN, DON'T PANIC, 
London Rev. Books, Feb. 7, 2002, at 15 (describing many of these examples); William Safire, Editorial, 
Colin Powell Dissents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A15 (describing State Department opposition to the 
decision on detainee status); Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.'s Cheney and Rumsfeld 
Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6 (describing how the Bush Administration has decided to treat 
those detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as unlawful combatants).)
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Although it is well established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply both to 
citizens and non-citizens alike, such protections do not extend to individuals subjected to 
trial in military tribunals for war crimes.427  In Application of Yamashita, the Supreme 
Court traced the history of military tribunals and concluded that by recognizing them “in 
order to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants . . . Congress gave 
sanction, as we held in Ex Parte, to any use of military commissions contemplated by the 
common law of war.”428  Under customary and treaty-based international law, military 
tribunals are appropriate forums for trying war criminals and unlawful combatants,429
although they do not necessarily provide all of the Geneva Convention rights afforded to 
prisoners of war.430
President Bush’s order providing for the trial before military commissions of 
aliens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities or membership in al Qaeda431 has 
been controversial – perhaps proving once again that, especially on the question of how 
best to balance individual rights with national security, reasonable people can differ.  
Members of the President’s own party had sharply differing views.  Sen. Orrin 
Hatch (R. Utah), the senior Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, supported 
427 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1949) (holding that German nationals who were convicted of 
war crimes and detained by U.S. authorities abroad were not entitled to constitutional protections).
428
  317 U.S. 1 (1946).   See also Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153, 169 n.66 (1993).
429
 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 and n.8.
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T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
431 Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
§2(A)(1)(i)-(iii), 66 FED. REG. 57,833, 57,834 (2001).[hereinafter Military Order].  The order defines the 
class of persons subject to military trial to include “any individual who is not a United States citizen” with 
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that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United 
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or 
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Bush, but Rep. Robert Barr (R. Ga.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee, 
decried the Administration’s lack of respect for civil liberties.432  Tim Lynch, director of 
the Cato Institute’s project on criminal justice, accused Bush of “arrogance” and his 
administration of trying to take presidential power “farther than it has gone before.”433
Even the conservative Heritage Foundation warned the administration to proceed with 
caution.434
Both liberals and conservatives have criticized the military order as a deprivation 
of basic constitutional rights, such as that to be tried before an independent court and 
jury, an appeal to independent judges, and full access to the evidence used to support a 
conviction.  Now a detainee can be tried, convicted, and ultimately executed without any 
independent judicial review, and without anyone outside the military – including the 
defendant – ever seeing the evidence upon which the conviction rests.
As the liberal group Common Cause pointed out in calling upon the 
President to reconsider, in our efforts to hunt down and bring to justice war 
criminals who have killed thousands of Americans, we have to make sure that 
justice itself does not become a casualty. “The policies your executive order 
would permit – namely secret trials with unappealable verdicts – seem eerily 
reminiscent of the kind of trials we have rightly criticized in other countries.”435
432
 Kevin Freking, Ashcroft: Tribunal Critics Aid Terrorists, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 2001, at 
A1.
433
 George Lardner, Jr., On Left and Right, Concern Over Anti-Terrorism Moves, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 
2001, at A40. 
434
 Morton H. Halperin, Stockade Justice: Why We Don’t Need Military Tribunals, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 17, 
2001.
435
 Letter to President Bush Regarding Secret Military Tribunals, Common Cause President Scott 
Harshbarger, available at, www.commoncause.org. 
118
118
Even some prominent conservatives joined the liberal media in denouncing the 
Administration’s plan to try terrorists before secret military tribunals.436  “It is a good 
sign for American democracy that voices are being raised against President Bush’s 
attempt to scuttle due process by sending foreign terrorist suspects to military tribunals,” 
editorialized the Boston Globe.437  “Why in the world do they need to use military 
tribunals?” asked the Greensboro (North Carolina) News and Record, noting that 
Timothy McVeigh, the domestic terrorist who blew up a federal building in Oklahoma 
City, had been tried in a regular court of law.438  An op-ed in the Milwaukee Journal-
Sentinel said, “Rarely, but inevitably, there comes a time when the American people must 
tell a president ‘enough.’ That time is now.”439
Spokesmen for the Bush Administration, meanwhile, have not been coy in 
defending the decision to use secret military tribunals in the legal war on terrorism.  Vice 
President Richard Cheney argued that terrorists did not deserve the guarantees and 
safeguards afforded to defendants by the civilian judicial system.  Attorney General 
Ashcroft said similarly that “foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United 
States” are not entitled to the protections of the American Constitution.”440
Other proponents of military tribunals argue that they would bring such criminals 
to justice quickly, that the President’s order would prevent reprisals against jurors by 
supporters of terrorist defendants, and that – because the proceedings could be held in 
436 See, e.g., William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001 at A16; Kangaroo 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at A19; and Voices of Negativism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A29.
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secret – the government could avoid disclosing classified information and the methods 
used to obtain it.  “An open trial…covered by television, would be an ideal stage for 
Osama bin Laden to spread his propaganda to all the Muslims in the World.”441
Moreover, despite criticism in the media, the President’s order appeared to enjoy
overwhelming public support.  A Newsweek poll found that 67 percent of Americans 
approved the plan, although ideas about how it should operate sometimes differed 
substantially.442
The Bush Administration moved to placate opponents by promising additional 
regulations outlining the actual procedures for the military commissions, to be drafted by 
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, which would provide for greater 
procedural protection than the original order requires.443  At the same time, however, the 
Administration challenged critics on grounds of national security and war-time exigency.  
In hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ashcroft bluntly told lawmakers that 
their “power of oversight is not without limit,” and that in some areas “I cannot and will 
not consult with you.”444
441
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Nevertheless, when the government prosecuted the first alien accused of terrorist 
activities after the order was issued, it brought the case in a civilian court, rather than 
before a military commission.445
Various law professors also argue in favor of having suspects tried by 
international tribunals.  Paul Williams and Michael Scharf, for example, write that the 
U.S. has been able to prosecute only a handful of “low-level culprits and ideological 
supporters.”  With potentially thousands of al Qaeda terrorists who could conceivably fall 
into the hands of the U.S. military, they claim that this process will neither serve as 
adequate justice nor as an effective deterrent to further acts of terror.  Moreover, domestic 
prosecution prevents the early apprehension of terrorists: this is what happened when the 
Clinton Administration declined Sudan’s offer in 1996 to turn over Osama bin Laden 
because there was not sufficient probable cause to try him in U.S. courts.446
Unlike in European tribunals, hearsay statements cannot be introduced in an 
American court.447   Moreover, there are limitations on what an intelligence community 
concerned with possible future attacks might be willing to expose in open court.  
Although the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 promulgates rules on 
using secret information in court, trials must remain open.  Non-classified information 
might also be of great interest to terrorists, such as disclosure that one of their manuals of 
procedure had been seized (allowing them to make adjustments).  In the 1993 World 
445
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Trade Center bombing, extensive engineering data on the construction of the towers was 
offered in evidence; while such information is public, it is much easier to obtain when 
brought into open court in a trial.  In short, the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are not 
morally and legally analogous to those who commit domestic crime.448  Even Harvard’s 
Lawrence Tribe –  not generally known for his conservative views –  concedes that 
civilian juries in wartime are not inherently likely to be any more fair than military 
tribunals.”449
Others feel that the appropriate forum for trying accused terrorists ought to be 
some form of international tribunal, convened under the authority of some international 
body, rather than simply the national courts of the United States – because the crimes 
committed by the terrorists are offenses against the world at large and universal morality.  
Moreover, those who try them should be seen to have the impartiality that is presumed to 
come with international rather than merely national institutions of justice. Supporters of 
this view tend to be academics, journalists, or members of the international non-
government organization (NGO) community.450
The virtue of international tribunals is not so obvious to European citizens, who 
naturally look to their own governments for security and justice.  Moreover, governments 
do not want the burden of hosting an international tribunal, or perhaps worse, being 
448 See also Kenneth Anderson, What  To Do With Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified 
Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 
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responsible for the imprisonment of convicted terrorists for long periods of time.  They 
would rather see the United States bear these risks.
Still others argue that, in view of the fact that the 9/11 attacks were directed 
against American property and people, allowing the United States to make the decisions 
and bear the security risks would be the morally correct thing to do.451
Non-military international tribunals have also been criticized as inappropriate and 
ineffective forums for trying terrorists.  Such standing tribunals are a relatively new 
concept, often formed by the countries on the winning side in an armed conflict. They are 
“costly and cumbersome”452 – as witness the international war-crimes tribunal in The 
Hague has been under attack for being too slow and expensive.  Moreover, because these 
proceedings are public, they do not provide for the adequate protection of sensitive 
information.453  International tribunals are also problematic because of such issues as the 
absence of a death penalty, possible security compromises of sources and techniques, and 
reduced levels of due process provided to the accused.454
*
All of the arguments pro and con have thus far been academic.  The first suspect 
who could have been tried by a military tribunal – Zacarias Moussaoui, a French-
Morocccan who was arrested in August 2001 as a co-conspirator in the 9/11 attacks –
was instead arraigned in a federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, where he will 
451 See Anderson, supra note 454 at 596.
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stand trial.455  None of the nearly 500 al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners being held either in 
Afghanistan or at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba have been found by the 
Pentagon to be suitable for the new military tribunals.456
Constitutional Issues
It is inevitable that, once again, the Supreme Court will ultimately be called upon
to assess the nature of the threat – criminal or military, abroad or here at home – and to 
decide whether or not the ordinary rules of constitutional law apply. 
Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has already cautioned that “we’re likely to 
experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case in our 
country.”  The limit will come, she suggests, at the point where “the cost to civil liberties 
from legislation designed to prevent terrorism outweigh[s] the added security that that
455
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legislation provides.”  That point is never easy to find during the heat of battle.  Finding it 
in hindsight, however, may mean finding it too late.457
*
President Bush’s Military Order refers to several statutes, but in issuing it he 
seems to have relied primarily on the inherent powers of his office, especially his 
authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.458  The Constitution does not 
empower the President to subject anyone he suspects of terrorist activity to a military trial 
(as the Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Milligan).459  On the other hand, the Court has 
endorsed the use of such tribunals to try foreign military personnel in places where there 
has been actual combat.460
Imperfect as the Military Order may be, the fundamental concept of using military 
commissions can well be justified morally, politically, and legally.  They can be shaped 
to accommodate the Constitution, international law, and the Geneva Conventions.  It is 
not unreasonable to expect them (as opposed to international tribunals or even ordinary 
U.S. district courts) to be the vehicle for the prosecution of at least the most serious 
categories of alleged terrorists (those who by their conduct and ideology have made 
themselves not merely criminals, but enemies).  Considering the sheer number of possible 
defendants, and the fact that the United States gained custody of them in the context of 
457
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armed conflict against a terrorist network and its state sponsors, the military tribunal 
model is arguably appropriate.
But the Military Order could as well be much too sweeping in it scope.  By 
proclaiming that the proposed tribunals “shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to 
offenses” committed by the individuals to whom the order applies, and that those charged 
“shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or 
indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in 
. . . any court of the United States,461 the President sought to insulate his military tribunals 
from all oversight by the civilian federal judiciary.462
Permanent residents of the United States, like citizens, should be accorded full 
constitutional protection.  The Military Order, however, fails to treat alien permanent 
residency as a separate and protected category of non-citizen.  Federal courts must still 
deal with the clear language of the Sixth Amendment: “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”  That 
language applies as well to permanent residents.  As Professor Tribe has stated, “[N]ot 
even Congress could empower a president to subject any resident alien to trial by tribunal 
whenever the president claims reason to believe that the accused ever aided or abetted 
what the president deems international terrorism.”463
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that the new measures are 
extra-ordinary.  “Our normal procedure is that if somebody does something unlawful . . . 
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the first thing we want to do is apprehend them, then try them in a court and then punish 
them.”  In the case of people like Jose Padilla, however, Rumsfeld says that is not our 
first priority:
We are not interested in trying him at the moment; we are 
not interested in punishing him at the moment.  We are 
interested in finding out what he knows.  Here is a person 
who unambiguously was interested in radiation weapons 
and terrorist activity, and was in league with al Quaeda.  
Now our job, as responsible government officials, is to do 
everything possible to find out what that person knows, and 
see if we can’t help our country or other countries.464
While on the surface the use of military tribunals to try terrorists apprehended 
outside the United States for war crimes committed in other countries makes a good deal 
of sense, it is certainly not an unavoidable necessity.  General courts-martial appear to 
have the authority to hear all such cases, and Congress has given the civilian federal 
courts jurisdiction in a large percentage of those that might arise.  That does not leave us 
with clear guidelines.  Professor Fletcher’s argument hits home: we are in a state of 
collective confusion.  “Our conceptual waffling has become dangerous, for at the same 
time that we cannot articulate what we are doing, we believe strongly that we must be 
doing the right thing. . . .We cannot agree on what we are doing, other than to affirm that 
it is the right thing to do!”465
A healthy democracy, however, depends on openness. The possibility that 
military commissions established to try alien members of al Qaeda might be misused to 
hide from American citizens information that they need to monitor and control their own 
government is reason enough to be skeptical about the Bush Administration’s plans.  
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Even if military tribunals are legal, using them to fight terrorism on the home front would 
be as unwise as it is unnecessary.
Perhaps the Secretary of Defense is right: the war on terrorism is so important that 
we need to lock people up, without charges, for the duration of the war, just to find out 
what they know. Perhaps it’s true that the new battlefields are not just in Afghanistan or 
Iraq or Israel, but extend everywhere, even onto our own soil.  Perhaps it’s true that, 
although in every other war American courts have permitted some kind of trial for enemy 
combatants, this war is different. Perhaps it’s true that we have to trust the government 
when it says the secret evidence against these defendants, even though they are 
Americans, cannot be revealed in a court of law for legitimate security purposes.
Perhaps the time has come for us to re-think our basic constitutional rights.
But if so, it’s not to be done lightly, and certainly not off the record.466
CONCLUSIONS
Government officials have responded to terrorist attacks by proposing and 
enacting “anti-terrorism” legislation.  Policy-makers believe that curtailing privacy and 
certain civil liberties can help prevent terrorism.467
The reason that academics have been slow to weigh in on the issue is much more 
likely due to the length of time it takes to write and produce law-review articles than to 
the fact that they have little to say.  Even those who appear on talk shows and write op-ed 
pieces understand the relative values of hindsight and history.
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But Americans especially must be careful not to tread on hard-won individual 
rights without a reasonable degree of certainty that preventive and investigative measures 
are temporary and absolutely necessary.
National security and individual liberty, after all, are two sides of the same coin. 
Counter-terrorism measures should be the least-restrictive means by which security can 
be enhanced.    In light of the government’s demonstrably aggressive aspirations, who is 
to say that the American Civil Liberties Union is overstating the point when it suggests
that the Bush Administration’s “insatiable appetite for control” is out of control?468
The legislation promulgated in the wake of 9/11 – enabling secret arrests, 
detentions, trials and deportations of terrorist suspects; ethnic profiling; the Terrorist 
Information Prevention System; and new surveillance techniques – has been criticized by 
both liberals and conservatives.  Both Democrats and Republicans have decried the USA 
Patriot Act as triggering governmental intrusions, such as the search for and seizure of 
previously private records, upon the mere assertion of the possibility of a connection to 
terrorist activity.
To be sure parts of the Patriot Act – like information-sharing between the CIA 
and FBI. – have been acceptable even to its harshest critics   But the government already 
has enough investigative powers to prosecute suspected terrorists.  The Patriot Act goes 
too far, and in so doing violates everyone’s civil liberties.
It is well-settled Constitutional law that basic First-Amendment, due-process, and 
equal-protection rights are not limited to citizens, but apply to all persons within the 
United States or subject to U.S. authority. These are human rights, not privileges of 
468
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citizenship.  So too, arguendo, are the criminal-procedural protections afforded by the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments which, arguably at least, could be extended to individuals 
subjected to trial in military tribunals.
The Administration’s underlying defense of its policies is that unprecedented risks 
warrant unprecedented responses.  Indeed it is hard to dispute the idea that the world 
grows more dangerous every day.  But that aphorism was equally apt during earlier 
conflicts.  No better example was World War II, in which there was also a surprise attack 
on American soil (at Pearl Harbor) and when weapons of mass destruction inflicted far 
more severe damage that those used in World War I.  It was true as recently as during the 
cold war with the former Soviet Union, armed as that nation was with huge stockpiles of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry.  
While the Bush Administration may arguably be justified in seeking to destroy 
weapons of mass destruction possessed by our self-proclaimed enemies, even to replace 
their rogue regimes, it has yet to make the case that these threats justify compromising 
our fundamental principles of liberty and justice.469
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the USA Patriot Act is its elevation of 
secrecy as a prosecutorial tool.  As one federal judge recently put it, “Democracies die 
behind closed doors.”470  Government policies that rely on deception and dogma to 
conceal failures often collapse in failure. Though it is obviously unreasonable to expect 
the military to disclose every aspect of its operations, the public – aware that actions 
taken today will likely have a long-lasting effect upon the country’s foreign relations –
469
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should at least know what its fighting forces are trying to accomplish in the name of the 
United States.  
The government should have to bear a heavy burden of proof that its restrictions 
on our civil liberties are absolutely necessary.  We should hold people accountable for 
their own actions, not blame them based on their ethnic, political, or religious identities.  
No one should be imprisoned without a public accounting, reviewable in a civil court.471
In these times of terror and tension, the urge to use whatever means necessary to 
defeat our enemies is understandable. Perhaps this war on terrorism is so potentially 
cataclysmic that we must lock people up indefinitely, without formally charging them, in 
order to prevent them from perpetrating acts of mass destruction, or merely to find out 
what they know. Perhaps this war is fundamentally different from all that have been 
waged in the past.  Perhaps we have no choice but to trust the government and its 
intelligence agencies when they demand secrecy.
But to do so, we must fully understand, is to abandon the Constitution that we 
have fought so long to preserve.
The farther we stray from our hard-won freedoms in order to vanquish those who 
would destroy our way of life, the more we become like them – and the more hollow our 
ultimate victory.
The perilous quest to preserve civil liberties in uncivil times is not an easy one, 
but the wisdom of Benjamin Franklin should remain a beacon:  “Societies that trade 
liberty for security end often with neither.”
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